Beauty, Good, Heautonomy, Autonomy

Kant's assertion, in #59 of the Critique of Judgment, that "the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good", seems difficult to reconcile with what otherwise appears to be a main theme of his Aesthetic theory, summed up in his assertion, in #58, that "beauty is not a characteristic of the object when taken in its own right."  For, according to the latter, the bearer of Beauty is not an object of some experience, but of an experience itself, i. e. the experience in which the enjoyment of the contemplation of some object is universally communicable.  Furthermore, the implied analogy of Beauty and the Good falsifies the latter, because the experience of the former is contemplative, while moral experience is, at least according to the doctrine as hitherto presented, is not.  However, a beautiful experience involves one process that does directly correspond to one involved in moral experience--what Kant calls 'Heautonomy', which, as he briefly explains, in part V of the Introduction, is the self-prescribing power of Reflective Judgment.  Accordingly, while 'symbol' might be an inappropriate characterization of the relation, a systematically coherent analogy between beautiful experience and moral experience is that between the Heautonomy of the former, and the Autonomy of the latter.

Spirit, Progressive Reason, Morality

Because Kant's principle of Pure Practical Reason is to be implemented for its own sake, regardless of any ends that might eventuate from it, it is a non-teleological principle.  Now, the interpretation of the principle as that of one of the non-teleological varieties of Reason surveyed--Distributive Reason--has already been discussed.  Alternatively, as that of the other variety--Progressive Reason--it is consistent with the theses that Spirit and Reason are identical, and that Spirit animates originality.  For, on that interpretation, the principle animates creative conduct just as Spirit animates innovative Art.  So, since novelty is relative to antecedent conditions, the content of Progressive Reason is necessarily contingent, e. g. with respect to historical conditions, in which case the abstractness of the principle is a virtue, not a deficiency, as Hegel, for one, charges.  Furthermore, because varying degrees of novelty are always possible in principle, the proper evaluation of progressive conduct is, likewise, in terms of degrees of originality, i. e. as more or less original.  In other words, traditional dualist Moral axiology, e. g. '"good" vs. "evil"', is inappropriate for a Progressive Morality, a doctrine which is implied by the concept of Reason that Kant briefly, though unarguably, entertains in the Second Thesis of his Idea for a Universal History.

Spirit, Communication, Art, Teleology

While Communication, according to Kant, plays an important role in the judging of Art, he does not seem to consider that it also functions in the production of a work of Art.  So, in the absence of any contravening consideration, it seems difficult for him to deny that what Spirit specifically animates in the artistic process is the communication, to others, via aesthetic ideas, of a content that, in the final analysis, is Spirit itself.  Furthermore, since, according to his classification, that process is "purposeless", it follows that Spirit functions in it non-teleologically, as opposed to, say, Hegel's concept of it.  Hence, insofar as Spirit is identical to Reason, it also follows that it is, likewise, one of the non-teleological varieties of the latter, which have been previously surveyed here, that is a factor in Kant's Aesthetic theory.

Reason, Teleology, Dialectics

As has been previously discussed, four varieties of Reason are Distributive, Progressive, Totalizing, and Unifying, any further systematization of which seems problematic, since that would apparently require a question-begging privileging of one of the varieties.  Still, as is, an important distinction can be drawn between the first two and the last two--the latter are teleological, while the former are not.  That is, neither Distribution nor Progression are inherently delimited, while Totalization and Unification are.  So, for example, while prominent versions of Dialectical Reason are teleological, at least one is not.  In particular, Marxist Reason, which totalizes society, and Hegelian Reason, which contracts Reality to the self-consciousness of Universal Spirit, are inherently delimited processes.  In contrast, Adorno's Negative Dialectics is an, in principle, incompletable process, so it can be classified as 'Progressive' Reason.

Varieties of Reason

Four distinguishable varieties of 'Reason' can be termed 'Distributive', 'Progressive', Totalizing', and 'Unifying'.  The first entails a transition from an individual to a universe of individuals.  The second is distribution qua increase.  The third is progression to an inherent maximum.  The fourth is a transition from a manifold to an individual.  Examples of the four are the processes of, respectively, dispersion, emanation, organization, and contraction.  Now, while Hegelian Reason appears to organize, it is contractive, since, all its developments are eventually revealed as moments in the achievement of the self-consciousness of one entity, Universal Spirit.  In contrast, Kant's principle of Pure Practical Reason seems to elude conclusive classification.  For, as has been previously discussed, there are grounds for interpreting it as Distributive, as Progressive, and/or as Totalizing, while Hegel contributes the further possibility that it is a unifying ruse of Universal Spirit.  Hence, Kant seems less certain of the nature of Reason than Hegel is, though, of course, if Schopenhauer is correct, what the four varieties have in common is that they are each, alike, illusory.

Spirit, Sense-Object, Expulse, Communication

If, as Kant conceives it, Spirit is an "animating principle", then the first moment of a 'phenomenology' of Spirit is not a sense-object, as it is for Hegel, but what can be called an 'expulse', which connotes better than 'impulse' that Animation generates manifest motion.  However, the difference between Expulse and Sense-Object  is no mere expression of a difference of interpretation of one and the same datum.  Rather, it entails a correction of a fundamental falsification of immediate Experience that Hegel, following Descartes and Hume, repeats.  For, what is self-evidently given in each of those projects is not some private element, but a process of writing.  Accordingly, the first moment in such a phenomenology is an Expulse to Communicate.  Now, because he conceives Spirit as a trans-personal principle, Hegel can accept, more easily than his predecessors can, as the foundation of Experience, an event in which the existence of a plurality of subjects is implied.  However, because he also conceives Spirit as a principle of Knowledge, and not of Action, he cannot recognize that event as essentially an act of communication, initiated by an expulse.  He, thus, inverts Kant's concept of Spirit.

Practical Reason, Progressive Reason, Experimental Reason

In the Second Thesis of Idea for a Universal History, following his introduction of what, as has been previously discussed, can be termed 'Progressive Reason', Kant further characterizes this faculty as requiring "trial, practice, and instruction in order to gradually progress".  Thus, the appreciation for Experimental Reason that he expresses in the Preface to the B edition of the 1st Critique is more than extrinsic whimsy.  Indeed, if, as has been previously proposed here, Pure Practical Reason is Progressive Reason, i. e. is an animator of innovative conduct, and Progressive Reason proceeds by trial and error, then Pure Practical Reason is also Experimental Reason.  This interpretation of Kant's concept is not easy to glean from a focus on his Deontological and Theological writings that ignores the Idea for a Universal History.

Practical Reason and Progressive Reason

As has been previously discussed, Pure Practical Reason is Spirit applied to personal conduct--it promotes example-setting processes, e. g. the generating of laws.  But, like Artistic Spirit, the only example that, in the final analysis, it sets is its own innovativeness.  Thus, the principle of Pure Practical Reason is a formula for universal innovative personal conduct.  Now, novelty is always relative to antecedent conditions; hence, the latter are always entailed in the former.  In other words, Innovation is always Progression.  Thus, Pure Practical Reason is Progressive Reason, applied to personal conduct.

Spirt and Practical Reason

Kant's principle of Pure Practical Reason defines an act of legislation, i. e. according to ii, a Rational agent creates laws.  Thus, a Rational agent can obey a given law only by re-legislating it, for, otherwise, mere law-abidingness contravenes the principle.  Furthermore, to establish some conduct as a law is to set it as an example, i. e. maxim-universalization is example-setting.  In other words, Practical Reason originates exemplary action in the same way that Spirit originates exemplary artistic works, thereby reinforcing the thesis, only briefly entertained by Kant explicitly, that they are one and the same.

Spirit and Progressive Reason

According to the Critique of Judgment, Spirit is the animating principle of an original process that produces exemplary works.  So, if, as Kant suggests at #5, Spirit and Reason are one and the same, Pure Practical Reason is, likewise, an animating principle of innovative, exemplary conduct.  As such, the maxim-universalization prescribed in its law is an example-setting, not an inclination-constraining, formula.  Now, while the interpretation of Reason as creative seems at odds with the deontological, and, even, conformist, tenor of the Groundwork and the 2nd Critique, it is more consonant with the progressive model of Reason that he presents in the Second Thesis of the Idea for Universal History: "Reason in a creature is a faculty of widening the rules and purposes of all its powers beyond natural instinct; it acknowledges no limits to its projects."  Noteworthy in this characterization is its brief glimpse of Reason as indefinitely progressive, and, therefore, as not only transcending any status quo, but as unconstrained by any utopian telos that retrospectively converts progress into a determinate 'history', such as the one that he eventually introduces, in anticipation of Hegel's and Marx'.

Spirit, Art, Reason

The concept of 'Spirit' is crucially undetermined in the Critique of Judgment, its only appearance in Kant's Critical trilogy.  For, as the animating principle of artistic creativity, it is the cause of both the quickening of the faculties culminating in judgments of Taste, and of further original productivity.  If so, then Aesthetic Judgment  is not sui generis, as his theory has it.  Furthermore, the relation between Spirit and Reason remains unexplored, beyond a few casual allusions to their identity.  Now, if they are one and the same, then Pure Practical Reason is an animating principle, and not merely a constraint on inclination.  In that case, both the standard interpretation of the Moral Law, and Kant's concept of Freedom, are inadequate to the creative originality of Reason.  So, in the absence of elaboration, his concept of Spirit seems to pose a significant challenge to two cardinal features of his system.

Art, Morality, Fecundity

Implicit in Kant's systematization of Art in relation to Morality is that the value of the former ultimately consists in its function as cultivating the latter, e. g. Poetry as Moral fable or parable.  Accordingly, while much of the 3rd Critique is devoted to isolating the supersensible components of Aesthetic experience from the empirical, much less attention is paid to distinguishing Art from pedantic Moral sermonizing.  The main ingredient for the latter exposition is present in Kant's theory--what might be called the 'fecundity' of Aesthetic ideas, i. e. their "rich material" (#47), that "prompts much thought" (#49).  However, the development of such an exposition would seem to conflict with Kant's marginalization of Genius, the source of such fecundity.  Furthermore, since the animating principle of Genius is Spirit, according to Kant, and Spirit is supersensible, a more elaborate analysis of Fecundity would require an explanation of the relation between Spirit and Reason, which seems lacking in his system as is.

Beauty, Pleasure, Creativity

At various places in the 3rd Critique, Kant considers five different responses to the consciousness of a beautiful object: 1. restful satiation; 2. an effort to "reinforce and reproduce" (#12) the representation of the object; 3. an effort to universalize the experience; 4. an attempt to productively imitate the object of beauty; and 5. the creation of a new beautiful object.  Now, #3 is, according to Kant's theory, the paradigmatic Aesthetic experience.  Accordingly, the harmonization of the cognitive faculties involved in that experience, is esteemed, in the theory, as the paradigmatic Aesthetic 'pleasure', an event that Kant's method immunizes from causal analysis.  In contrast, if #5 is recognized as the fully developed response to a beautiful object, then mere cognitive enjoyment is revealed as an effect, of diminished intensity, of the exhilaration of the creative process that the object of cognition conveys.

Contemplation, Satiation, Excitation

At #24 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant characterizes the contemplation of Beauty as "restful".  In contrast, at #12, he portrays that contemplation as not so restful, but, rather, as accompanied by an effort to "keep us in the state of having the representation" of the beautiful object.  There is no casual vacillation between the two passages: in the first, the 'pleasure' experienced is satiation, while in the second, it is excitation.  So, once it is recognized that the impulse to keep the representation continues as an effort to share it with others, then it becomes clearer that the universalizability that is, according to Kant, a characteristic of the experience of Beauty, is a wishful product of excitation.  In other words, Kant's theory augments the long tradition that esteems Contemplation teleologically, i. e. as private satiation.

Genius and Contemplation

As has been previously discussed, Kant distinguishes between 'following' Genius, i. e. producing another original work, from 'imitating' it, i. e. merely copying some of its features.  Elsewhere than in the context of drawing that distinction, he proposes a third possible reaction to a work of Genius--the contemplation of it, a "restful" response, as he characterizes it at #24 of the 3rd Critique.  Now, it is this latter reaction that is paradigmatic according to his theory, one problematic implication, therefore, of which is that being inspired by a work of Genius to produce another such work is a relatively inappropriate response to it.

Genius and Representation

The ostensible ground for Kant's subordination of Genius to Taste is its un-universalizability.  However, that attribution is difficult to reconcile with his earlier recognition of the exemplariness of Genius,  Instead, a more consistent basis for the status of Genius in his Aesthetic Theory is implied by his ascription of inimitability to Genius, namely that it is unrepresentable.  For, in a theory that conceives Fine Art as fundamentally Representational, as a branch of a system that conceives Experience, in general, as Representational, Unrepresentability is a sufficient ground for a diminished status, if not for non-status.

Firstness, Oneness, Genius, Taste

The title of #40 of the Critique of Judgment is 'Fine Art is the Art of Genius', and the first sentence of the section is "Genius is the talent . . . that gives the rule to art.". At #50, Kant states that "art . . . deserves to be called fine art only insofar as it shows taste", later adding that "taste . . . consists in disciplining (or training) genius.  It severely clips its wings . . ."  So, by denying that Genius governs Art, #50 plainly contradicts #46.  Indeed, the attribution, by Taste, of 'Beauty' to an object, is, according to Kant's theory, independent of whether or not the object is a product of Genius.  That is, the theory distinguishes the singularity of the experience of such objects, from the originality of the genesis of such objects, privileging only the former.  In other words, a beautiful object is a One, but not a First, contrary to the character of the highest value in the theory of Fine Art that Kant briefly entertains at #46.

Firstness, Oneness, Genius

One clear example of Firstness in Kant's system is the "inspiration" that produces a work of Genius.  Accordingly, any subsequent originality that has been inspired by that example is not so much a Second, but a Second First.  In contrast, the mechanical imitation of a work of Genius is an uninspired One that has reduced its object to mere Oneness.

Firstness, Oneness, Noumenon

The incapacity of human knowledge to explain why humans respect Reason is not a defense of the absence, in Kant's theory, of an explanation of how that respect entails a bridging of the noumenon-phenomenon chasm.  Indeed, that absence might reflect an impossibility that refutes the posited heterogeneity of the two realms.  Instead, the difference between the realms might be one of degree, like that of the continuum between his categories of Negation and Reality, or of that between Firstness and Secondness, rather than one of kind, such as that between Oneness and Twoness.

Oneness, Firstness, Causality

A fundamental ambition, at least in its earlier stages of development, of Kant's concept of Pure Practical Reason, is to attribute Firstness to Oneness, i. e. to establish the causal efficacy of the principle of Consistency.  According to his exposition, at least initially, the specific moment of that causality occurs when, in a rational being, the idea of Consistency effects respect for Consistency.  Eventually, however, he breaks that causal link, when he interposes freedom of choice.  But even prior to that modification, respect for Consistency means nothing more than constraint from an inconsistent course of behavior.  In other words, no effect follows from the idea of Consistency, thereby perfectly exemplifying Oneness as a principle of stasis, i. e. as no First.

Reason, Oneness, Firstness

The distinction between Totalizing Reason and Distributive Reason is derived from that between Oneness and Firstness, respectively.  For, the constraint of inconsistent behavior, required by Totalizing Reason, is based on the Parmenidean ideal of changeless unity, while the setting of an example, prompted by Distributive Reason, is an expression of the source of dynamic universal creativity.  Thus, the inherent productiveness of Firstness exposes the inadequacy of Totalizing Reason as 'Practical', i. e. exposes it as a Theoretical principle applied to Practice.  Furthermore, that Firstness, at minimum, presents an alternative to Oneness, exposes the undefended subscription, e. g. Kant's, to the latter as arbitrary, so the Reason that is derived from Oneness is not necessarily 'Pure'.  In contrast, the priority of Ordinal Numerality over Cardinal Numerality, previously argued for here, applies to that of Firstness over Oneness, e. g. Oneness, like Cardinality, lacks the very concept of Priority that such an argument entails.

The One and The First

On the basis of Parmenides' The One, Motion and Multiplicity are irreal.  In contrast, on the basis of Plotinus' The One, which he conceives as the source of Emanation, Multiplicity is not irreal, but remains less real than Oneness.  Thus, Plotinus' more significant break with Parmenides is to conceive Motion, i. e. the process of Emanation, as fully real, which Bergson seems to appreciate better than most of his modern peers.  Still, the concept 'one' is static and self-contained, and, therefore, remains problematic as the source of a dynamic process.  Instead, a more appropriate characterization of Plotinus' principle is 'The First'.

Morality, Imitating, Following

At #32 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant distinguishes "following" an example from "imitating" one.  Later, at #47 and #49 he proposes that the former does not entail the implementation of a determinate rule, thereby implying that the latter does.  So, insofar as the adoption of his principle of Pure Practical Reason is interpreted, as it most prevalently is, as entailing the concept of a maxim of conduct as an instance of a determinate universal law, that adoption 'imitates' the principle.  In contrast, insofar as, as has been proposed here, it is interpreted as entailing the concept of a maxim of conduct as setting an example, that adoption 'follows' the principle.  Likewise, the formulation of a rival Moral principle, e. g. that of Utilitarianism, can be interpreted as, paradoxically, 'following' Kant's example.

Distributive Reason, Morality, Mimesis

Since imitation can be conceived as a type of adaptation, the emergence, in Darwinism, of Adaptation as a fundamental psychological principle suggests that Mimesis transcends its traditional Aristotelian restriction as an 'Aesthetic' topic.  Thus, for example, insofar as Representation is imitative of its object, Mimesis is an Epistemological topic, as well.  Likewise, insofar as, as is plain from earliest childhood behavior, imitation mediates interpersonal relations, it is not only a Moral topic, but, perhaps, the basis of all Morality.  But, imitation presupposes an exemplar.  Thus, Distributive Reason, i. e. the setting of an example, entails a recognition of the Moral significance of Mimesis.

Distributive Reason and the Principle of Pure Practical Reason

Kant's principle of Pure Practical Reason is, to all known appearances, unprecedented, i. e. there is no evidence that it antedates him.  Thus, his formulation either makes explicit what is eternally implicit, culminates recent intellectual developments, or is simply an untimely product of genius--his own theory of History seems to suggest that he himself subscribes to the second hypothesis.  In any case, as a novel phenomenon, that he clearly projects as universally applicable, the principle is a product of example-setting Distributive Reason.

Distributive Reason, Totalizing Reason, Convention

The Platonization of the trial of Socrates transforms a critique of conventional interpretations of the concepts of 'impiety' and 'corrupting the youth', into a triumph of Soul over Body.  Likewise, Kant's pitting Totalizing Reason against individual inclination, finds common ground with conventional Deontology.  In contrast, Distributive Reason, which originates examples, is a potentially more effective vehicle of liberation from convention, and, thus, is closer to Socratic than to Platonist Reason.

Distributive Reason, Legislative Reason, Duty

Instead of reinforcing conventional Moral of Duty, by casting Rational Morality as structurally deontological, Kant might have taken the opportunity to present a critique of the former, i. e. by showing that the only duty worth acting upon for its own sake is rational duty.  To that end, instead of treating focusing on the subsumability of maxims under the formulations of Legislative Reason, he might have emphasized that maxims themselves are the source of laws.  For, as the basis of the creation of a law, a maxim is clearly independent of antecedent convention.  Thus, more generally, Distributive Reason, as the form of Examplification, more effectively liberates an individual from convention than does a Totalizing Reason, to the product of which one might have a 'duty' to submit.

Distributive Reason, Moral Copernican Revolution, Heliocentrism

Children imitate adults; adults serve as examples for children.  In other words, moral development entails a transition from Mimesis to Examplification.  So, as the expression "shining example" suggests, if there is a Moral 'Copernican revolution' to a heliocentric model of Rational conduct, it is to Distributive Reason, in which Reason sets examples, in the same way that the Sun distributes light throughout its system.  Accordingly, Autonomous Deontology, e. g. Kant's doctrine, constitutes an  incomplete stage of such a revolution.

Totalizing Reason and Distributive Reason

While Totalizing Reason unifies a multiplicity, Distributive Reason generates a multiplicity, for which the source is a universal entity.  Now, for Kant, Theoretical Reason is plainly Totalizing Reason.  However, in some respects--the Moral Law, qua first introduced by Kant; the universalization of a maxim; and the concept of a perfectly rational individual--his Practical Reason is, arguably, interpretable as Distributive Reason, while in others--the Kingdom of Ends, Soul, Deservedness, and God--it is Totalizing Reason.  Given that Totalization and Distribution are inverse processes, the admixture is potentially problematic for his Moral doctrine.  Specifically, their contrast with the productivity of Distributive Reason exposes those Totalizing elements of the doctrine as Theoretical, and not Practical, ideas.