Will and Power-Increase

Spinoza conceives an increase in power as a greater approximation to perfection, and as a decrease in passivity. One shortcoming of those formulations is that they cannot accommodate the increase in power entailed in most learning experiences, which are usually comprised of the surpassing of achieved perfection, e. g. learning to dribble a basketball combines a mastery of running and a mastery of bouncing a ball. In contrast, here, any increase in power presupposes an irreducible quantum of Will, with increase not limited a priori to some maximum. So, to avoid the arguably teleological limitations of his concept of power-increase, Spinoza could, similarly, jettison the perfectionism of his ontology, and develop his own thesis that even the most passive behavior entails an minimum active component, i. e. he could re-conceive his passive-active contrast as less active-more active.

Will, Freedom, Negation

As previously discussed, Kant erroneously interprets Spinoza's concept of Pleasure--a liberating process--as an extrinsic consciousness of that process. He compounds the error by interpreting Spinoza's concept of Freedom--the transformation of passive behavior into active behavior--as a mere constraint upon passive behavior., thereby facilitating his utilitarian calculation of presumed 'freedom' as relatively meager. Underlying the second error is his interpretation of that Freedom as Negation, without the further recognition that Negation is an abstraction from Differentiation. That recognition is expressed here by the concept of Will as the principle of Diversification in personal experience, i. e. a re-direction of behavior, not a cessation of it. Accordingly, Kant cannot appreciate that Freedom for Spinoza is exemplified not by the resistance to a tempting aroma, but by replacing compulsive eating with a dietary regimen. That short-sightedness also shapes Kant's own efforts to derive positive duties from a formula that is fundamentally a prohibitive principle.

Will, Virtue, Pleasure

Kant ascribes to Spinoza the following argument: 1. Pleasure is the consciousness of Virtue; 2. The degree of pleasure involved in the consciousness of Virtue is greater than any involved in the satisfaction of some need; 3. Therefore, Virtue suffices without Happiness, i. e. without the satisfaction of needs. Kant challenges the conclusion by denying #2, i. e. by observing that the pleasure of self-control does not suffice to offset circumstantial miseries. However, #1 is erroneous ascribed to Spinoza. For, the latter's concept of Pleasure is that it is identical to Virtue, i. e. he innovatively conceives it to be itself an energizing process, rendered here as Will, and is not an extrinsic receptive representation of one, as Kant construes the concept to be. It follows from that concept that the greatest Virtue and the greatest Happiness are identical, not that Virtue suffices without Happiness, e. g. that virtuous eating, i. e. eating according to a regimen, is more pleasurable than compulsive eating, not that self-controlled hunger is more pleasurable that yielding to some tempting aroma. In other words, Spinoza is a non-teleological Eudaemonist proposing an a priori defintion of Pleasure, and not, as Kant takes him to be, a Stoic offering an a posteriori utilitarian evaluation of Virtue.

Will and Mirth

Mirth has a distinctive status in Spinoza's system--it is a pleasure of the whole of an entity, as opposed to localized pleasures that he characterizes as 'stimulation' or 'titillation'. Now, the relation between that distinction and his general definition of 'pleasure'--an increase in the strength of an entity--is unclear, since it leaves unexplained how a localized pleasure can constitute an increase in the condition of an entity as a whole. In any case, the characterization of pleasure as stimulating, even with a derogatory connotation, demonstrates that pleasure is not for Spinoza, as it is often elsewhere taken to be, a termination of a preceding process, but an origination of an new one. Here, Will is the source of all novelty, so Pleasure is a concomitant of Will. Furthermore, on this model, the primary function of Comprehension is homeostatic, so insofar as it effects balance in the exercise of Will, the resulting action can be called 'mirthful', or, 'exhilarating', a more common contemporary synonym.

Will, Self-Preservation, Magnanimity

For Spinoza, there are two main species of Virtue--Courage, the effort to preserve one's being, and Magnanimity, the effort to aid and befriend others. However, this concept of Magnanimity seems inconsistent with his principle that all behavior is an effort to preserve one's being. For, on the basis of the latter, generosity seems reducible to a means to self-preservation, and, hence, does not seem to merit the distinction of being 'high'-minded. In contrast, here, Magnanimity is not fundamentally problematic in the context of self-oriented behavior, because the fundamental personal principle is not Self-Preservation, but Evolvement, i. e. growth. So, since Evolvement entails Will, the extending of oneself towards others, Magnanimity is co-extensive with the fundamental personal conatus, and is not, as it is for Spinoza, a problematic surd for the system.

Will, Freedom, Adequacy

One and the same meal can be eaten for one of two reasons--either as a response to an irresistible aroma, or as an application of a general regimen, informed by nutritional principles as well as by sensory appeal. While for some, the former is 'free', i. e. is not interfered with, for Spinoza it is the latter which is truly 'free', i. e. is the product of an adequate idea. In addition, according to the theory of Will, as presented here, the latter case entails more Volition than the former. For, a response to even the strongest external compulsion still entails at least some Will, i. e. at least the Motility to pursue the lure, but without the possibility of an alternative course of action. In contrast, a general dietary plan opens up alternatives, e. g. tonight's fish might have been chosen in combination with the choice of chicken tomorrow. Similarly, the 'freedom' that some invoke to justify compulsive economic behavior is an idea that Spinoza classifies as 'inadequate'.

Will and Self-Determination

Spinoza's denial of the existence of 'free will' often gets him classified as a 'determinist'. However, a more precise rubric comes from a notion often associated with contemporary political theory--'self-determination'--because Spinoza believes that all behavior has a prior cause, in some cases internal, in others external. Furthermore, as a word that is relatively fresh to the traditional 'free will vs. determinism' debate, 'self-determination' helps reveal how that opposition is typically misbegotten. For, 'self-determination' more clearly connotes a transition from indeterminacy to determinacy, and, with 'term' literally meaning 'limit', not 'choice', a transition from formlessness to formed, not from undecided to decided, as it commonly is taken to be. Now, while traditionally, inert 'matter' has been taken as the recipient of 'form', here, Matter, as has been discussed, is construed dynamically, e. g. in personal experience, Will is the recipient of Form. Hence, 'self-determination' is the process of supplying oneself with a structure for the exercise of one's energies, and, more, generally, Will and Determination are not antagonistic alternatives, but are complementary principles of action. Spinoza's focus on Efficient Causality, to the neglect of both Formal and Material, perhaps prevent him from arriving at a similar conclusion.

Will, Master, Slave

A main inspiration for some contemporary Oligarchical ideology is Nietzsche's analysis of Democracy as the revenge of the weak many against the strong few. That analysis is presented under the rubric of 'slave morality vs. master morality', an apparent evocation of Hegel's 'master-slave' dialectic. However, in the latter, the 'slave' triumphs not by diminishing the 'master', but by discovering self-sufficiency, i. e. the efficacy of one's own personal Will, as it as been rendered here. Consequently, the Hegelian slave no longer needs the master, in the same way, ironically, that the Nietzschean 'master' does not need the 'slave'. So, regardless of Nietzsche's own actual ambitions, today's Oligarchical critique of Democracy often resembles the revenge of a weakened ex-master against his erstwhile possessions.

Will, Equalization, Pluralization

The addition of a new element to a given set can be represented as an equalization of the newcomer to the original members. However, it can also be interpreted as an increase to the set, as well as as a pluralization of it. Likewise, the granting a person the same powers that some others have already enjoyed, can be represented as a process of equalization of the former to the latter, but on the other hand, it can also interpreted as both an increase in the strength of the society, as well as as a pluralization of it. Thus, Democratization, often represented by Oligarchs as a process of equalization, can also be interpreted as a strengthening pluralization of a society, i. e. by the empowerment of all the individual Wills that constitute it.

Will, Democracy, Equality, Plurality

Spinoza offers two derivations of Democracy--one from the universality of Natural Rights, the other from the commonality of Reason. The weakness of the former is the potential of Democracy to degenerate into an arena of self-indulgence, while that of the latter is the factual variability of rational capacity, each of which exposes the vulnerability of Democracy as an Egalitarian principle. However, his system includes the grounds of a different derivation. For, he asserts that every entity endeavors to increase its strength, and that a composite entity is itself an entity, from which it follows that a polity seeks to increase its strength. Now, one way that a polity can accomplish that is by maximally empowering the Wills of each of its participants, i. e. by a process of Democratization. In other words, Democracy can perhaps be more soundly conceived as the product of pluralization than as one of equalization.

Will, Democracy, Friendship

The Straussian interpretation of modern political theory as a morally degenerate version of its ancient counterpart, i. e. the subordination of Good to Right, misses a more fundamental development. For, Spinoza's concept of Democracy pioneers an extension of the ancient concept of Reason, an extension that becomes more fully formulated in Kant's system. The central thesis of modernized Reason is the equivalence of distinct 'I's which Aristotle classifies as 'friendship', but not necessarily as 'rational', a category which, following Plato, is exclusively intra-psychic in his system. In other words, Spinoza's concept of Democracy is a universalization of the Aristotelian good Friendship, a derivation which is, therefore, independent of any concept of Right. Here, whether localized or universal, the recognition of a distinct I as another 'self' entails the recognition of another entity as alterior to oneself, a process which is effected by Will, the principle of Externalization in personal experience. On the basis of that model, the Straussian critique of modern Democracy is that its universal Equality trivializes Friendship, one response to which is that that critique expresses a small-mindedness that is unequal to the ardors of modern Morality.

Will, Democracy, Empowerment

For Spinoza, Democracy is empowering, because, as an adequate idea, behavior in accordance with it can only be active. The framing of the U. S. Constitution was empowering, because, in the process, its framers were authoring their own lives. Dewey's notion of a Democracy as an ongoing process of Reconstruction attempts to refresh that original empowerment. In contrast, the notion of the Constitution as sacrosanct reduces Power to an abstraction, bestowed by the document, and passively received by subsequent citizens. Here, Democracy is not merely empowering, but a potentially maximally empowering form of government. For. interaction with others is a potential occasion for extending Will, i. e. to learn from others, so the latitude in experience enjoyed by each citizen is potentially beneficial to every other one.

Will, Democracy, Heteronomy

Spinoza's recognition of the natural right to heteronomous behavior, in conjunction with his contention that Democracy violates no natural right, compromises his concept of Democracy in three ways. First, the conjunction conflicts with the status of Democracy as an adequate idea, i. e. as one which does not accommodate heteronomous behavior. Second, it encourages the interpretation of Democracy as an economic system that is primarily a means to the satisfaction of every wish. Finally, it, therefore, leaves his concept of Democracy vulnerable to the Straussian charge that it fundamentally promotes self-indulgence. In contrast, the interpretation here avoids that compromise, by emphasizing that Democracy is primarily an ongoing collectively active process, rooted in the exercise of the Will of each of its participants. The entailed denial, on Spinozist grounds, of natural right to heteronomous behavior, has previously been discussed.

Will, Divine Right, Democracy

Spinoza's equation of God and Nature entails one of Divine Right and Natural Right, and, hence, that a Democracy is a Theocracy. Thus, the immediate context of his theory of Natural Right is the doctrine of the 'divine right of kings', not the ancient priority of the Good, as Leo Strauss has it. However, it theory does entail a mediate challenge to the latter--whereas that idea of the Good is a source of enlightenment accessible to only a few, Spinoza's doctrine re-conceives Ethics as program of universally accessible empowerment, i. e. available to any entity possessing what is here defined as Will. In other words, Spinoza's Pantheistic transformations of Political Theory and Ethics elude Strauss's interpretive scheme, and the Oligarchical purposes to which the it is sometimes put.

Will, Right, Might

Spinoza advocates the thesis that 'Might is Right'. For, he holds that natural right is co-extensive with natural power, i. e. with the endeavor to persist in one's being, in general, and with the exercise of one's talents, in particular. However, his unabashed application of that principle to violent or foolish behavior seems ungrounded. For, on his analysis, such behavior entails, at least in part, inadequate ideas, and, hence, it is, at least in part, heteronomous, i. e. it entails external influences such as compulsion, social conditioning, etc. Thus, violent or foolish behavior is not entirely a product of one's own powers, and, therefore, is not co-extensive with natural right. In contrast, here, the irreducibly personal element of any behavior is Will, the principle of exertion that activates any endeavor to persist, in general, and any exercise of talent, in particular. On that model, degree of volition in behavior is a function of the expansiveness of the ideas that impart determinacy to Will, on the basis of which violent or foolish behavior is exposed as typically compulsive, i. e. as typically with little scope for deliberation. Hence, it is not that Might is not Right, but that on Spinoza's own definition of 'adequacy', behavior constrained by external influences is not truly personal Might.

Will, Idea, Empowerment

Spinoza's definition of Circle--the figure described by drawing in which one end is fixed and the other end free--both formulates what a circle is, and explains how to produce one. Hence, it is an empowering idea, but not because it somehow imparts energy to the muscles that perform the drawing. Rather, as has been previously discussed here, it empowers because it facilitates the exercise of Will by supplying indefinite Motility with determinacy. There is nothing arcane about this analysis; to the contrary, as is plain from its formulation, the definition is first and foremost a definition of the drawing of a circle, i. e. it imparts determinacy to a presupposed physiological process.

Will, God, Self-Causality

Since, for Spinoza, God = Nature, it follows for him that natural power = divine power, and that natural 'right' = divine 'right'. In other words, taking into account Spinoza's political theory makes it difficult to interpret the intuition of God as either a moment of Leibnizian enlightenment, or as one of Schopenhauerian resignation, rather than as one of personal empowerment, i. e. as one of the discovery of one's divine powers. Now, one divine power is self-causality, one aspect of which is, therefore, expressed in Extension. Hence, the intuition of God entails the discovery of Will, i. e. of Motility, a discovery which thereby exposes as inadequate the traditional idea that one's Body is essentially inert.

Will and Democracy

Insofar as the idea of Circle is, for Spinoza, a common idea, its adequacy is independent of any personal possessor of it. Similarly, his ideas of common goods, including the one that entails them all, i. e. the idea of Democracy, are all impersonal. Hence, his political theory runs the risk of Totalitarianism, i. e. of abstracting from all personal differences. Now, while examining the possession of idea of Circle, he does not consider the process of actualizing a circle, i. e. the drawing of a figure in accordance with that idea, a process which entails the personal Will of the drawer. Similarly, his idea of Democracy abstracts from the ongoing, and, possibly, unending, process of constructing a Democracy, a process which eludes reduction to Totalitarianism, because individual participation is essential to it.

Will, Preception, Actualization

As has been previously defined here, 'Preception' is the 'process of carrying out some plan of action'. Since that process combines indefinite Motility and some representation, it combines Will and Comprehension. Furthermore, because the products of Preception are actual, the process can also be called 'Actualization'. For example, insofar as a circle is actual, the process that produces it--physiological motions guided by the plan formulated as 'the drawing of a figure in which one end is fixed and the other is free'--is Actualization. Now, any such formulation is, according to Spinoza, an adequate idea, and, hence, is one aspect of divine creativity. In other words, Spinoza's 'natura naturans' is the process of Actualization.

Will, Actuality, Actualization

In some passages, Spinoza defines the 'actuality' of a Mode as its endeavor to persist in its being, while in others, he proposes that it consists in a specific configuration of its various parts. However, he does not elaborate on the relation between these two characteristics, which must be more fundamental than that between Body and Mind in his system, because he ascribes the endeavor to the Body-Mind conjunction, and he proposes that Body and Mind are parallel composites. In contrast, here, exertion and structure are expressions of the two principles of personal experience--Will and Comprehension, respectively--the combination of which constitutes the process of Actualization. On that basis, the endeavor and the configuration of Spinoza's Modes are each a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of actuality, i. e. of the product of Actualization.

Will, Motion, Rest

According to Spinoza, Extension consists of two primary characteristics that he sometimes calls 'infinite modes'--Motion and Rest. Now, insofar as Extension is a dynamic divine Attribute, the derivation of Rest from it is unclear. Furthermore, the concept does not explain how Motion can become Rest, or vice versa, the former of which is entailed in any completion of creativity, e. g. the completion of the creation of a finite Mode, and the latter of which is entailed in divine self-causality, i. e. in which God sets himself in motion. In contrast, here, Motion and Rest are conceived as abstractions from more primitive originating and terminating processes, i. e. from the Material Principle and the Formal Principle, respectively, of the system, e. g. Will and Comprehension in the context of personal experience. Accordingly, Motion and Rest are just as much infinite modes of Spinozist dynamic Thought as they are of Spinozist dynamic Extension.

Will, Eternity, Ubiquity

According to Spinoza, Mind expresses its actual essence--its endeavor to persist in its own being--in two ways. First, qua the idea of its Body, it promotes the maintenance of the integrity of the latter via the acquisition of adequate ideas, e. g. adequate knowledge of nutrition. Second, qua merely idea, it seeks its eternality as a mode of divine Thought. Now, as has been previously discussed, Spinoza does not seem to ascribe an actual essence to Body, thereby missing how it, too, can endeavor to persist in its own being. In contrast, Will, as presented here, entails processes that are analogous to those that Spinoza ascribes to Mind. First, as a principle of Variation, Will, alone, explains how a Mode, as Spinoza recognizes, endeavors to increase its strength, i. e. Mind can only maintain a given degree of strength. Second, Will, qua Motility, is an impulse to an indefinite elsewhere. So, just as Mind, a mode of divine Thought, seeks Eternity, Body, a mode of divine Extension, seeks Ubiquity.

Will, Matter, Extension

Wolfson proposes that Spinoza conceives the Extension-Thought relation as one of Matter-Form, with the innovation that Extension is as dynamic as is Thought. Now, while that interpretation explains how Extension and Thought can be two aspects of the same entity, it also gives rise to three further problems. First, it leaves unexplained how, as Spinoza contends, other Attributes are possible, i. e. how Matter and Form can admit of other complementary aspects. Second, the traditional notion of Form entails that of Formal Causality in relation to its corresponding Matter, thus entailing a violation of the non-interactionism of Spinoza's Extension-Form relation. Finally, neither Wolfson nor Spinoza elaborates on how Matter, traditionally conceived as inert, can be dynamic. In contrast, the 'Formaterial' system being developed here assumes Spinoza's insight, and attempts to resolve those problems. In general, the system conceives Matter-Form as Multiplicity-Unity, so, analogously, it defines, respectively, as a dynamic Material Principle, Becoming-Diverse, and a dynamic Formal Principle, Becoming-the-Same, with everything comprised of some combination of the two principles. Thus, for example, personal action combines Will and Comprehension, the Material and Formal Principles of personal experience. Accordingly, the system jettisons Spinoza's non-interactionism, as well as the possibility of additional equiprimordial Attributes, a thesis of little consequence anyhow in his system.

Will and Causal Chain

Spinoza's denial of 'free will' is based on his thesis that each idea in a Mode, adequate as well as inadequate, is part of some causal chain or other. However, like most traditional concepts of 'causal chain', his entails an unnoticed profound lacuna--the gap between an idea qua, first, effect of a preceding cause, and, then, qua cause of a subsequent effect. In other words, Spinoza accepts the traditional suppression of the distinction between two moments ascribed to one and the same element. In contrast, the distinction between the terminal moment of one episode, i. e. an effect, and the initiation of another, i. e. a cause, is here one of fundamental principle, i. e. that between the Formal and the Material Principles, respectively, of the system. In the context of personal experience, the Material Principle is Will, an origination of a novel episode that is irreducible to any of its conditioning antecedents. So, whatever the merits of Spinoza's arguments against 'free will' may be, they seem to be oblivious to this volitional dimension of behavior.

Will and Emotion

Sartre's theory of Emotion diverges from Spinoza's in one significant fundamental respect--whereas in the latter, an emotion is an undergone modification, in the former, it is a type of nascent action. In other words, for Sartre, an emotion is 'magical thinking', i. e. is a vicarious action in response to a situation, e. g. 'love' and 'hate' are vicarious attempts to preserve, or to eliminate, respectively, some influence. Here, even such vicarious exertion is a manifestation of Will. Accordingly, the effectiveness of Spinoza's program, which is based on the thesis that understanding an event as 'necessary' suffices to quell any emotion attached to it, is, on Sartre's analysis, due to the neutralization of vicarious action by depriving it of a specific target. Sartre's theory thus has the further advantage of being better equipped than Spinoza's to propose concrete alternative action as an effective corrective to an emotion, i. e. for Spinoza, the acquiescence arising from a moment of self-control does not suffice to generate a potentially reinforcing redirection of one's active powers. But, despite those differences, each doctrine implicitly rejects the kind of glorification of Emotion promoted by e. g. popular culture.

Will, Existence, Actuality

'Existence' seems equivocal for Spinoza, e. g. both an undrawn rectangle that is inscribed in a circle and a drawn one 'exist' in his system. Now, since each of those types of rectangle possesses extension, the latter cannot be the criterion of the distinction between the two. Instead, one way of characterization the difference is as 'virtual' vs. 'actual', given that Spinoza often uses the latter in reference to living Modes, to contrast them with their immortal essences, which are in God in the way a virtual rectangle is implicit in a circle. However, seemingly still lacking in Spinoza's system is an account of the process of actualization, e. g. 'causality' is insufficient, since it applies to virtual essences as well to actual things. In contrast, here, the nature of the process of actualization is clear from Spinoza's own genetic definition of a Circle--a combination of Will, i. e. indeterminate Motility, and structuring in accordance with the terms of the definition. Given Spinoza's recognition of virtual Extension, it is difficult to project into his system any analogously decisive notion of 'actualization'.

Will, Objectivity, Eternity

In some passages, Spinoza seems to suggest that the telos of the Ethics is the attainment of an intuition of God, but in others, that attainment is presented as implicated in the cultivation of adequate ideas, i. e. as a necessary means to the achievement of liberation from the influence of the Emotions. In that context, an adequate idea is analyzed as knowledge from a God's-eye view, that Spinoza characterizes as 'the aspect of eternity', a perspective that seems equivalent to the more contemporary classification 'objective', e. g. his analysis of the feeling of pleasure as an increase in strength. Now, as has been previously discussed here, the attainment of 'objectivity' entails a process of Externalization, e. g. an 'objective' perspective on oneself is one from the 'outside', a process that is effected by Will. Furthermore, self-objectification entails an hypostasization of the processes that are under observation, thereby eternalizing them. In contrast, Spinoza offers no explanation of what he means by 'eternity', especially as it pertains to a God which is presumably an indefinitely ongoing dynamic force.

Will and Acquiescence

As the reference in the proof of V, xxvii indicates, by 'acquiescence', Spinoza means personally pleasurable 'self-approval'. Hence, for him, the intuition of God that gives rise to acquiescence is not to be confused with a moment of Schopenhauerian self-denial. Still, the nature of the selfhood that such self-approval entails is unclear. For, the personal identity of a Mode, for Spinoza, is, ultimately, an a priori idea, and the specific object of the approval is a power of action, the source of which, in his system, are impersonal adequate ideas. So, in the absence of a principle such as Will, as defined here, to explain the personal a posteriori exertion involved in the cultivation of that power, any satisfaction that ensues remains seemingly unearned.

Will, Body, Essence

At III, vii, Spinoza defines 'essence' as a thing's "endeavor to persist in its own being", a definition which, in his note to II, ix, he indicates applies to Mind, and to the Mind-Body conjunction. Hence, he implies that the definition does not apply to Body, i. e. he implies that the essence of Body is not its endeavor to persist in its own being. Instead, at V, xxii, he suggests that the essence of Body is, more precisely, the essence of "this or that body", which implies that the essence of Body consists in its individuality. That implication is reinforced by his general thesis that Modes are distinguished by corporeal differences, i. e. that adequate ideas are common to different modes, while inadequate ones are contingent on physical differences. However, he stops short of explicitly defining the 'essence of this or that Body' as a 'principle of Individuation', a principle which, as has been previously discussed here, entails Will, the principle of Differentiation in personal experience. On that definition, personal identity is a product of self-cultivation, not an eternal essence that both precedes and survives the existence of its associated body, as it is for Spinoza, in apparent contradiction to his Thought-Extension Parallelism.