Will, Comprehension, Petite Mort

The experience of a sudden realization affords a fleeting glimpse at how the process of Comprehension immanently both dynamically synthesizes a manifold, and effects its closure. It also confirms Whitehead's insight that the moment of Satisfaction in a Concrescence is never objectively experienced by a subject, but is one into which the given subject itself gets absorbed. Accordingly, the term 'petite mort', more commonly used to describe the moment of biological satisfaction, can be similarly generalized. Now, just as information-processing is for Whitehead only a special case of Concrescence, in Formaterialism, Comprehension, most generally, serves a homeostatic function in an organism, including that of the stabilization of Motility, i. e. of Will. Hence, Comprehension can be said to effect the petite mort of Will.

Will, Comprehension, Ouroboros

The thesis being proposed here, that the immediate matter of Comprehension is Will, opposes two traditional notions. One, that the immediate object of Consciousness is some external object, has already been discussed at length. The other originates with Aristotle's ideal of 'thought thinking itself', i. e. that the immediate object of Knowledge is Knowledge itself. While that ideal is inspired by his appreciation of the perfection of circular motion, he does not distinguish between virtuous and vicious circularity. Hence, the efforts of the tradition that he founds are often suitably symbolized by the image of the latter--Ouroboros, the snake trying to swallow its own tail--especially where that circularity is not only recognized but deified, e. g. Hegel, Fichte, early Sartre. On the other hand, whether or not the snake that Zarathustra wrestles with is Ouroboros is debatable. In any case, that Will is the immediate matter of Comprehension codifies Kant's insight that Knowledge can know itself only as it appears to itself, not as it is in itself.

Will and Indecision

'Buridan's Ass' is an image of immobility due to indecision, i. e. the impulses to move in conflicting directions cancel each other out. Now, this image is a special case of nascent Will, i. e. of self-activation driving in all directions at once, and, hence, resulting in immobilization. Furthermore, the point of departure of Will is always a comprehension of one's situation hitherto, which usually includes a perception of external circumstances. It is this combination of external perception and nascent Will, which, when abstracted and refined, constitutes the various processes of detachment that have been important in Philosophy and other disciplines, e. g. Stoic withdrawal, Cartesian doubt, Phenomenological epoche, etc. Common to these methods is their failure to recognize their volitional component, and, hence, that they entail a physiological moment in their presumed escapes from corporeality.

Will, Doubt, Corporeality

A key inference in the Cartesian method is from 'I doubt' to an incorporeal 'I think'. Now, 'I doubt' means, more precisely, 'My representation of some object may be inaccurate', i. e. 'Further consideration could determine that the actual state-of-affairs is otherwise than how I have represented it to be'. Hence, for example, 'I doubt that it is fire that I have been seeing' means 'It is possible that if I put my hand in what I have been visually taking to be fire, I will feel no burning sensation'. Likewise, for the Cartesian, 'I doubt my corporeality' means 'It is possible that I can discover that all that I have been taking to be my corporeal experience has been simulated'. However, a chronic difficulty for the latter analysis is avoiding being question-begging, e. g. the most famous explanation of how such simulation can be accomplished, the 'brain in the vat' model, does not eliminate corporeality. But, the deeper problem for the method is to explain 'otherwise', which it sidesteps by abstracting 'not' from it. In contrast, here, Will, the process of physiological self-activation, is the principle of Diversification in Experience. Thus, on this model, Doubt is not incorporeal. Hence, the Cartesian inference from 'I doubt' to an incorporeal 'I think' is, at minimum, dubious.

Will, Dialectic, Exteriorization

In Hegel's system, the exteriorization of Mind is one stage of a more general development from the barest mental datum to complete absolute knowledge. The motor of the system is dialectical, i. e. every transition is from a lesser to a greater degree of knowledge. Hence, the exteriorization of Mind, too, is motivated by the insufficiency of merely interior states. In contrast, here, the exteriorization of Mind is Will, a process of Excession, i. e. one which destabilizes a previously settled situation. Thus, growth, here, is an, in principle, indefinite process. In contrast, the Hegelian Dialectic terminates in a messianic moment, thus escaping one problem facing the Marxist Dialectic--providing an account of political, economic, and interpersonal relations once Socialism is achieved. In either case, the finitude of the Dialectic exposes its temporary nature.

Will and Tools

The human ingenuity involved in the invention of tools is usually interpreted teleologically, i. e. as a means to the more effective securing of goods. However, that explanation does not sufficiently account for the most famous invention, the wheel, or for either the more elaborate transportation modes that have followed, or for the discovery of new goods that are preceded and occasioned by some invention. Hence, the concept of the tool as an extension of human physiological processes has greater explanatory power for that ingenuity. So, since Will is the principle of self-extending in human experience, the invention and use of tools is primarily an expression of it, with purposiveness a derivative, even if frequent, special case.

Will, Self-Knowledge, Labor

As previously discussed, one common interpretation of Kant's 'refutation of Idealism' is that it argues that self-knowledge is mediated by the knowledge of environmental objects. Hegel is one who seems to subscribe to that interpretation, when he offers his influential thesis--that self-knowledge is a function of one's effects on one's environment, i. e. is mediated by labor. However, Hegel's phenomenological method preemptively abstracts from knowledge of one's corporeality, thereby eliminating the possibility of self-knowledge being attained in the course of one's physiological processes, e. g. in a dance performance. In contrast, the recognition that Will, i. e. Motility, is a fundamental principle of Experience, not only exposes the arbitrariness of Hegel's method, but also places his attempt to spiritualize Labor back on its feet.

Will and the Refutation of Idealism

Kant's 'refutation of Idealism'--a refutation of the inference from 'I think' to 'I am'--that appears in the B edition of the 1st Critique, turns on the assertion that the knowledge of any existent entails a permanent substratum. The standard interpretation of this argument is that for Kant, only some environmental entity can possess a permanent substratum. However, the A edition classification of this topic, that it is part of the problem of the Immortality of the Soul, suggests that for Kant, the permanent existence presupposed by the 'I am', is one's own body, not some other physical entity. While the effectiveness of such an internal critique of Idealism surpasses that of the mere ridicule of the thesis by Moore and Heidegger, Formaterialism, goes further by offering a genetic critique that exposes Idealist methodology at its source. That source is the original process of detachment from the physical world, e. g. Doubting, Epoche, etc. which, as has been previously discussed, requires an exercise of Will. But Will is Motility, i. e. physiological self-activation. Hence, what is dubious from the outset in Idealism, is not the world from which it presumes to detach itself, but that such methodology guarantees its purported result.

Will and Efficient Causality

Efficient Causality is typically formulated as a relation between two events, with the nature of that relation the main focus of a philosophical interest that is typically motivated by the application of the relation to means-end purposefulness. However, Spinoza's use of the term 'modification', and Kant's of 'alternation', suggest that an 'effect' entails a transition from a prior condition to a subsequent one. Hence, the standard interpretation of the Effect of an Efficient Cause abstracts an atomic event from what is, more fundamentally, a variation of conditions. But, in Formaterialism, it is Material Causality that effects variation. Thus, Efficient Causality is a special case of Material Causality. Similarly, the fundamental efficacy of Will, the Material Principle of personal experience, consists not in the purposive production of some discrete event, but in the diversification of one's situation.

Will and the Observer Effect

An occasional experience is when it feels to one as if 'one is being watched', followed by confirmation, e. g. by the discovery that someone behind has indeed been looking at one's back. One explanation of such an experience is that it is an instance of the 'Observer Effect', a term more usually used to characterize how mere observation influences an experiment. In the mundane experiential case, that rubric would imply that the act of observation actually entails some causal efficacy, e. g. the emission of an impulse felt by the target. Now, according to some predominant Epistemological theories, the Observer Effect is in such a case impossible in principle, because they hold either that observation is a passive process and/or one the subject of which incorporeal, and, therefore, incapable of generating a physical emission. In contrast, on the basis of the model, presented here, that observation is a mode of Will, i. e. of externalizing Motility, the question of the validity of the Observer Effect is an empirical one, a re-classification which the experimental instance of the phenomenon suffices to justify.

Will and Solipsism

Spinoza proposes that the knowledge of external objects is mediated by the knowledge of the bodily modifications effected by those objects. For Kant, objective knowledge is constructed on analogy with that of those effects, which, according to Kant, are sensory representations of their causes. Pragmatism neutralizes the skepticism to which Kant's Constructivism is vulnerable, by formulating objective knowledge as hypothetical. Still, the matter of a Pragmatist hypothesis remains subjective representations, which leaves its and Kant's variations on Spinozism vulnerable to the charge of solipsism. However, Formaterialism, with its principle that Will is the immediate matter of representation, recovers Spinoza's insight that what is immediately represented in knowledge are objective physiological processes. That principle exposes the charge of solipsism as confusing privileged access to an objective event with groundless imagination, thereby reinforcing Spinoza's thesis in a way that neither Kant nor Pragmatism does.

Will, Knowledge, Encounter

The pragmatist reading, 'If one encounters O, one will perceive P', of the objective proposition 'O is P', demonstrates that the contemplatibility and the instrumentality of an object presuppose its encounterability. However, the relation of contemplatibility to encounterability is not one of objective Knowledge to some more primitive mode of contact, but of a more highly developed mode of objective Knowledge to a more primitive one. For, the fundamental organic function of Knowledge is homeostatic--it serves as the Formal Cause of Will by circumscribing Motility, e. g. the color C delimits the field of vision before it is attributed to an object, or before its utility is determined. In other words, all objective Knowledge, even 'information', is a more or less refined circumscription of a Knower. So, an object of Knowledge is not so much what one is not, as Sartre conceives it, but where one cannot move.

Will, Correspondence, Coherence

Epistemological theories can be both explanatory and normative. For example, according to 'Coherence' theories, cognitive processes consist in the integration of a manifold, so that the criteria of Knowledge are consistency and completeness. In contrast, according to 'Correspondence' theories, cognitive processes consist in a relation between mind and something non-mental, with agreement between the two the criterion of Knowledge. Hence, the two types of theory are not competing normative theories with respect to one and the same cognitive model, but are two distinct explanatory models governed respectively by two distinct normative principles. Now, the Correspondence model presents the correlation, when it obtains, between Mind and Object as a fait accompli, whereas according the Formaterial model, any such correlation requires construction, entailing a combination of the extending of Mind towards Object, and the homogenizing of the them. On the other hand, by conceiving Will as the extending of Mind towards some object, and Comprehension as the subsequent integration of that interaction with other such exercises of Will, the Formaterial model shows how a Coherence theory can have greater explanatory power than Correspondence theories. Furthermore, in the absence of a distinct Correspondence explanation of the Mind-Object relation, the Correspondence normative principle remains only a special case of the Coherence normative principle.

Will, Comprehension, Correspondence

An Epistemological theory can be both descriptive and normative, i. e when it both explains cognitive processes and proposes that some relation between a mental state and an object is paradigmatic of Knowledge. A common instance of the divergence of those two functions is when a Coherence theory is challenged to demonstrate Correspondence, as when Kant attempts to prove the existence of the external world on the basis of his a priori Transcendentalism. Implicitly respectful of the criterion of Correspondence is the ridicule of Kant's effort, by Moore and Heidegger, on the ground that the existence of the external world is self-evident, as is the concession of Pragmatists that probability of correspondence suffices for practical purposes. In contrast, the formulation here, that Will is the immediate matter of Comprehension, is both explanatory and normative, and, hence, the thesis rejects as irrelevant any demand to justify any presumed correlation of Comprehension to external objects, beyond the recognition that the representation of them is always mediated. Instead, it regards such correspondence as primarily a practical relation, one that needs to be created, not one that is either given as certain or as uncertain.

Will, Comprehension, External Objects

That the immediate matter of Comprehension is Will entails that the knowledge of external objects is mediated by Motility. Hence, the fundamental stratum of that knowledge is a modification of Motility, i. e. impassability, which can be attributed to an external object as 'resistance'. So, theories which propose that sensory interaction is that fundamental stratum fail to recognize that the occurrence of a sense datum, prior to being considered in itself, constitutes an impediment in the range of the relevant sense. Likewise, Pragmatists who hold that instrumentality informs that fundamental stratum overlook the sheer there-ness of an object that hinders Motility. Hence, the meaning of the verb 'object' is closer to that of the concept of an object of Comprehension than are the various common meanings of the noun 'object'.

Will, Comprehension, Comprehensiveness

In common parlance, the terms 'comprehension' and 'comprehensiveness' are seemingly unrelated--the former refers to a mental state, while the latter characterizes the scope of something. The conceptual connection between the two becomes more evident when Comprehension is recognized as a process of synthesizing a manifold, thereby entailing a scope that can be described as more or less comprehensive. Now, as has been previously discussed, the immediate matter of Comprehension is Will, a manifold of volitions that can be quantified as 'vols'. Hence, actions can be compared in terms of the degree of volitional comprehensiveness--e. g. running, entailing more vols than walking, is a more comprehensive action than the latter--and can be evaluated accordingly.

Will, Comprehension, Prehension

The concept of Comprehension, as previously introduced, entails a criticism of Whitehead's theory of 'prehension'. By characterizing the fundamental contact between an organism and its environment as 'prehensive', Whitehead invokes the image of 'grasping'. However, that image undermines his characterization of that contact as always being initiated by an external impulse, to which a prehension is fundamentally a response. For, that characterization abstracts from the process of reaching towards an object that the grasping of it presupposes, a discrescent process, as has been previously discussed, whereas Whitehead's system does not recognize Discrescence. In contrast, according to the model of Experience being developed here, Will is the process of self-extending. Hence, its formulation 'Will is the immediate matter of Comprehension' more accurately connotes 'prehension' than does Whitehead's theory.

Will, Consciousness, Comprehension

'Consciousness', as hitherto conceived here, is an immanent dynamic integrative process. Now, the formulation that has been presented, 'Will is the immediate object of Consciousness' primarily establishes a challenge to theories that posit some external item as its immediate object. However, that formulation still inherits the relation 'object of', which misleadingly connotes that upon completion of the process, Will remains external to Consciousness. To the contrary, Consciousness is the process of internalizing exercises of Will. Hence, a more accurate formulation is 'Will is the immediate matter of Consciousness'. Furthermore, to better avoid the legacy of the notion of 'consciousness' as having an object, 'Comprehension', understood as dynamic, more accurately connotes the internalization involved in the process of coming to awareness. Henceforth, then, 'Comprehension' will be used here to characterize the Formal Principle of Experience, and its relation to the Material Principle will be formulated as 'Will is the immediate matter of Comprehension'.

Will and Self-Interest

According to one popular doctrine, all motivation is 'selfish', i. e. one always acts only in one's self-interest. Now, even superficial consideration reveals two of the weaknesses of such a doctrine--it is apparently refuted by the common example of a mother who would sacrifice her life for her child, and it is specious, i. e. it does not distinguish between what would benefit and what would harm the 'self'. Furthermore, deeper confusion in the doctrine is exposed by an analysis of it in terms of the model of Experience being developed here. According to that model, Will is the plastic principle of self-activation that receives determinacy from the representations of Consciousness. One such representation is the intention to acquire goods for oneself only, with consideration of others given only to their potential instrumentality to acquisition. Another such representation is to promote the goods of as many people, including oneself, as possible. Since, in itself, Will is plastic, a third representation is necessary to decide which course of action to pursue, and such a representation must evaluative. In other words, the popular 'selfishness' doctrine is a disguised normative principle, which its proponents seem either unable or unwilling to acknowledge.

Will and Preception

Previously introduced here was the notion 'Preception'--the process of carrying out instructions. Apparently, this practical process has been neglected by Pragmatism, with the only notable treatment being Wittgenstein's study of rule-following. However, the latter focuses only on the linguistic dimension of the process, plus, it leaves unexamined the relation of 'following'. In contrast, according to the model of Experience being developed here, all intelligent behavior is preceptive, and, furthermore, does not consist in a sequence in which first some instructions are presented, and, then, some physiological motion follows. Rather, it entails a combination of Will and Consciousness--the Material Principle and the Formal Principle, respectively, of Experience--in concurrent coordination. More precisely, in action, Consciousness provides some representation that throughout guides and structures the exercise of Will. The common mistake, which Wittgenstein, too, makes, is to construe the representation as appearing only at the outset of the process, with respect to which, the physiological phase is subsequent. But, in fact, the Formal Cause of the process remains operative throughout the presumed merely physiological phase, as is more evident when some course of action is being first learned.

Will and Transcendence

'To transcend' means 'to exceed', and the principle of Excession in the model of Experience being presented here is Will. Thus, on this model, Transcendence is a mode of Will. Hence, the model refutes traditional doctrines that argue that the very idea of a transcendent realm, or of a transcendent entity, proves the existence of its content, on the grounds that the idea could not be derived from any immanent source. In fact, Evolutionary Theory, in positing that organisms have a natural impetus to develop higher types, entails such a refutation of those traditions. That such a refutation remains relatively under-explored is likely a reflection of the typical subordination of that thesis to the survival principle in Darwinism.

Will and Examplification

Previously introduced here was the notion 'Examplification', meaning, 'to set an example', which entails both 'to externalize oneself' and 'to extend oneself'. Since, the latter two are among the characteristics of Will, Examplification can be understood as an expression of Will. Now, 'to set an example' can also be analyzed as 'to act as if one's intended action were universalized'. Thus, one reading of Kant's principle 'act only on that maxim that you can at the same time will to be a universal law' is 'act as if you were setting an example'. Hence, the 'will' implicated in Kant's formulation is 'Will' as defined here, even if he does not recognize it as such, i. e. he leaves the process of 'universalizing a maxim' unexamined.

Will, Counting, Quantification

The process of counting entails two moments--the introduction of a novel element, and the integration of that element into what has been previously accumulated. But, the introduction of a novel element requires the exercise of Will. Hence, Will is intrinsic to Counting. Now, Quantification hypostasizes Counting. Hence, Will is intrinsic to Quantification. Thus, to assign a quantity to the exercise of Will makes explicit the inner structure of Quantification, and, so, is no mere heuristic device, as is the assignation of numerical values to Pleasure and Pain by Utilitarianism.

Will, Evaluation, Empowerment

Will is the principle of Self-Activation in Experience, according to the model being developed here. Hence, the evaluation of an action in terms of vols expresses how much comparative self-energization it entails, thereby potentially serving as the basis a decision procedure. The vol can thus be instrumental in maximizing personal empowerment. The heuristic quantification of action is, of course, a central feature of the most prominent Ethical doctrines. However, in those, Motility is typically either suppressed, constrained, or subordinated to some ulterior purpose, by intellectual processes. In contrast, volitional evaluation liberates Motility, by seeking the greatest possible scope for it.

Will and Vol

Will is, in itself, indeterminate, but, as previously discussed, in some cases, a distinction between 'greater' and 'less' volition seems meaningful, e. g. a composite action seems plainly to involve a greater exercise of Will than does one of its components. So, for heuristic convenience, a unit of volition can be called a 'vol', in terms of which actions can be compared. For example, if it takes one exercise of Will to stand up, and another to then start walking, walking measures 2 vols, and standing, 1 vol. Such quantification of actions thus facilitates a comparison of them in volitional terms, an evaluation of potential use to decision-making in the service of empowerment.

Will and Quantification

While Will is, in itself, indeterminate, specification, e. g. via Intention, facilitates the quantification of it. For example, the following sequence entails four exercises of Will--the transition from sitting to standing, from standing to walking, from walking to running, and from running to bouncing a ball while running. In other words, the act of dribbling a basketball can be characterized as entailing a quantity of four units of Will. Now, that the transition merely from sitting to standing itself entails a manifold of motor activity shows that the establishment of a unit of such quantification is arbitrary. Nevertheless, the example demonstrates that under some circumstances different acts can be compared in terms of quantity of Will, e. g. dribbling entails more Will than does walking.

Will and Habit

Two of the traditional cardinal notions of Ethics--Virtue and Freedom--are seemingly antithetical to one another. While a virtue is a species of habit, and, hence, is inculcated and repeatable, Freedom is novel, and, hence, is independent of any previous conditioning. Virtue predominates for Aristotle, but Kant argues that every new experience challenges any prior achievement. Now, Formaterialism recognizes the two notions as respective expressions of its two principles--Freedom as Material Causality, i. e. the process of setting oneself in motion, and Virtue as Formal Causality, i. e. the structuring of Motility. In this system, that the two principles are inversely related does not preclude that Experience is constituted by their combination, as is in evidence in improvisation, i. e. innovation that does not sacrifice structure. Likewise, more generally, a previously acquired habit can inform any new occasion, and it does not seem likely that Aristotle would reject Kant's implication that Courage entails the welcoming of new challenges.

Will and Epoche

Husserl's 'Epoche' is a methodological suspension of ordinary experience, to facilitate an examination of Consciousness. The primary effect of the suspension is a transformation of the world of things to a world of phenomena for Consciousness, a sphere of certainty, according to Husserl, and, therefore, suitable to serve as a foundation for all specialized Knowledge. Now, plainly in principle, the blind spot of his Phenomenology is the Epoche itself--since it precedes the opening up of the phenomenological arena, it cannot be examined within it. In contrast, on the model presented here, Will is the source of any experiential discontinuity, so, it must be an ingredient in Epoche, i. e. the latter combines the detachment of Will from a preceding perception, while retaining those perceptual contents for further examination. Now, the incapacity of Epoche to accommodate Will might explain why Husserl's phenomenological world does not include processes such as looking at, listening to, etc. Regardless, since Will is the principle of experiential uncertainty, insofar as it is implicated in Epoche, Husserl's ambition of establishing a foundation certain Knowledge is undermined from the outset.

Will and Leap of Faith

The notion 'leap of faith' is pioneered by Kierkergaard to formulate the essentiality of groundlessness to the belief in the existence of God. The entailed notion of a 'leaper' informs Jaspers' concept of Existentialist Selfhood. Here, Will, as the spontaneous departure from givenness, can be characterized as a 'leap', though, in itself, as an indeterminate one. On that basis, a leap to believing in the existence of God is as much a specification of Will as is that to any mundane physiological motion. Accordingly, contrary to Jaspers' doctrine, religious commitment does not uniquely define Selfhood.

Will and Self-Creativity

The point of departure for Will is always what one has previously become, and what one has previously become is, in the final analysis, constituted by the consciousness of one's motions, which include looking at, listening to, etc. Hence, any subsequent modification of one's environment is always mediated by self-diversification. Accordingly, as one creates, i. e. as one produces some unprecedented object, one has a novel experience, and, so, one becomes newer. In other words, insofar as Will initiates Creativity, it initiates Self-Creativity.