Capitalism and Democracy

'Capitalism' and 'Democracy' are often spoken of as if they were either synonymous, or even identical. The influential foreign policy principle, 'exporting Democracy', is an example of their univocal treatment. Such usage, and the thinking behind it, seems to ignore that Capitalism is an Economic system, and Democracy, a Political one. Furthermore, that, e. g. Fascism can be Capitalist, and Socialism can be Democratic, demonstrates that they are not equivalent. Plus, insofar as a true Democracy is an indigenous one, a policy of exporting it is foolish. However, it is not merely that they are not equivalent, for they are potentially antagonistic. For, Democracy entails Equality, whereas Capitalism not merely does not entail it, but tends to reject it. If there is any principle of Equality in Capitalism, it is either in the homogeneity of the monetary unit in circulation, or in the equilibrium between Supply and Demand achieved in a transaction. But neither of these is tantamount to an Equality of the participants. This is not to argue that Capitalism is antagonistic to Evolvementalism; to the contrary, it is usually an expression of the Material Principle ingredient to any collective Evolvement. But, as such, it must be coordinated with the Formal Principle, i. e. some homogenizing factor, as exempified by Democracy, i. e. the combination of Freedom and Equality. So, where Capitalism is inadequately fettered, e. g. where corporations are considered 'Persons', and money-spending on political campaigns is considered 'Free Speech', the political system is not Democracy. In other words, if any political system is identical with Capitalism, it is Plutocracy.

Greed and Goodness

The origin of the phrase 'Greed is Good', often associated with Reagan-era Morality, is usually taken to be Gordon Gekko, in the film Wall Street. However, the source is indeed factual, Ivan Boesky, so as a characterization of the ethos of the era, it is not fictional. Two contemporary responses to this praise of Greed are theoretically well-grounded. Some have argued that there is a distinction between Greed and Self-Interest, with which Adam Smith would concur, since for him, Self-Interest is to be coordinated with Sympathy. And, Salman Rushdie's observation, that Greed is a type of Insanity, is supported by the Aristotelian analysis, which holds Vice to be a psychological unbalance, i. e. Intemperance. The Evolvemental analysis of Greedy behavior goes further--such behavior is caused by an external object, and, hence, it lacks the Self-Control entailed by Idionomic Freedom. But, Greed can also be deliberate Conduct, as when one is acting on the basis of the Principle 'Greed is Good' itself. Now, there might be contexts in which such a Principle is constructive, i. e. as a corrective to self-dissipation, e. g. to mob mentality, to Heidegger's 'They', to self-destructive self-sacrifice, etc. But, in such situations, it is only a special application of the general Evolvemental Principle, 'Balance the promotion of one's own interests and that of others'. Such comparative narrowness of Principle demonstrates that, at best, Greed has small Phronetic Value.

Aging

The 'Aging' process is generally spoken of as something that begins to befall one at approximately the age of 40, leading inevitably to death. Despite the ingenuity of modern science, the search for something that can 'reverse' Aging has been going for probably as long as people have been aging. Still, even when such a 'cure' is only a speculative hope, there is often defiance of Aging, namely, when one asserts that one 'does not feel one's age', or that one is 'only as old as one feels'. But, the very use of the term 'Aging' in this context is indicative of the soundness of the thinking involved. 'Aging' simply means 'to get older', so a 15-year old 'ages' just as much as a 50-year old. Furthermore, the use suggests a passivity in the face of getting older that, at bottom, is expressive of a Mind-Body Dualism in which Experience is something that befalls a disembodied 'Subject'. Now, it is difficult to argue against the apparent fact that human bodies begin to run down at a certain point, but it does not follow that Experience is fundamentally passive. Rather, Experience is ongoing, and cumulative, and even an episode of physical weariness is an addition to one's autobiography. Because Experience is cumulative, it is 'anisotropic', i. e. asymmetrical, the reversing of which, even in speculative fiction, which is never more than externally descriptive, is fundamentally inconceivable. And, the 'feeling' of one's age is not to be found in the vitality, or lack thereof, of the moment, but in one's memory. Even when one feels physically robust, it is only insofar as one entertains long and deep memories that one is 'feeling one's age'.

Sufficient Reason

The Principle of Sufficient Reason is traditionally regarded as one of the two cardinal Principles of Reason. Its relation to the other, the Principle of Contradiction, is a matter of debate--whether either is reducible to the other, or they are independent of one another. The Principle of Sufficient Reason requires that anything that exists have a complete ground of its existence. The fundamental structure of the Principle is syllogistic--the combination of an existent, and some Universal proposition, of which the former is an instance. The two main types of such Universal proposition are Theoretical Laws and Practical Principles. The most familiar versions of Theoretical Laws are scientific laws, and of Practical Principles, Ethical maxims. The Principle of Sufficient Reason governs any question, abstract and everyday, 'Why?'. The general structure of the response to 'Why?' is 'Because . . .' followed by the citing of a relevant Universal proposition, a citing which is often only implicit in everday circumstances, while specialists endeavor to make it explicit. So, why some object fell to the ground might be explained by citing the Law of Gravity. Or, why one helped another in need might be explained by citing the Golden Rule. And, any dissatisfaction with an explanation is an expression of its insufficiency, a calling for the citing of an alternative principle, or for the additional citing of other principles, e. g. the Law of Gravity does not, by itself, explain why an object might shatter when it falls. So, those who assert an aversion to 'Reason' are likely ignoring their reliance on it in even the most mundane of circumstances. Now, in Formaterialism, a Universal principle expresses that something pertains throughout a System, so the application of that principle to a new event is an incorporation of the novelty into the System. In other words, the Principle of Sufficient Reason is also a description of Evolvement.

Organism and Society

Entailed by Kant's Moral Theory is a concept of a society that he initially describes as a 'Kingdom of Ends'. Two main characteristics of this society are that the activity of each member is guided by an ideal of the whole society, and that each acts to benefit others as well as oneself. Later, in his study of Teleology, he calls this a concept of an 'Organism', and is there primarily concerned with showing how the concept of reciprocal beneficially guides our investigation of Nature. But, he also very briefly notes that Political Theories have occasionally been Organistic, without any explicit citations. Surely Plato's Republic, with its interactive components analogized from a person's, and possibly Rousseau's society, governed by a General Will, qualify as Organistic, whereas, Locke's polity, in which association is based on self-interest alone, might not. Kant further marvels that while hitherto, as of the 1780s, Organic polities were primarily abstract ideas, the newly-born United States of America is the first actualization of such an idea. However, with the predominance of the Principle of Self-Interest in contemporary society, it is difficult to apply Kant's insight to the current U. S. In any case, the Evolvemental concept of the best society is Organic, in the Kantian sense, with an advantage, that Kant lacks, of having the resources of Evolutionary Theory to help show that such a society is also a growing society.

The Love of Money

It is sometimes said that 'money is the root of all evil', but the accurate Biblical quote is that 'the love of money is the root of all evil'. Now, given the violence sometimes wreaked by jealously, even the accurate version is plainly false. But there are those who seem to reject it, not merely because there are some evils that have causes other than the love of money, but because they regard the love of money as the root of all good. The foundation of such a thesis is often the doctrine that all human behavior is self-interested, entailing that the love of money is good either as a self-interested end, or as a means to other self-interested ends. The common assumption that Adam Smith is an advocate of such a doctrine is mistaken, because complementing his pro-selfishness views expressed in Wealth of Nations, is his assertion in an earlier work that Sympathy is the highest Moral Principle. Hence, as Utilitarianism brings out, and as the title of Smith's most famous work plainly expresses, he regards the personal pursuit of wealth to be a means to a collective good. For Kant, any merely instinctual behavior has in itself no Moral worth, so, likewise, the merely conative drive to secure wealth has, in itself, no Moral worth. As Rationally determined, the Kantian Moral status of that pursuit depends on the articulated motives involved--securing wealth as a means to helping others is Morally worthy, but treating an other as a mere means to securing it is forbidden. The Evolvemental evaluation of the Love of Money depends on the situation. Individual Evolvement is deliberate growth, but the instinctual pursuit of money is not deliberate, and the pursuit of money as an end in itself would terminate growth, so neither of these cases have Phronetic Value. Now, the process of deliberately making money in order to make more money for oneself is Evolvement, but is Evolvement of a limited nature, compared e. g. to someone who makes money in order to promote personal growth in other areas, or to someone who makes money in order promote the interests of others. So, the best that Evolvementalism can say for the Love of Money is that it is often not the most worthy course of Action.

Mathematics, Logic, and Experience

Despite the many differences in conceptions of Mental processes, the Philosophical tradition has been in general unanimity that the proper sphere of Mathematics and Logics is Cognition. For Plato, Mathematics is the object of disembodied Contemplation, while for Aristotle, Logic is the contemplated essence of Ontological relations. They remain disembodied processes for not only Descartes, but for the British Empiricists--for e. g. Hume, they are abstractions from disembodiedly-perceived qualities. Kant challenges this tradition by conceiving them as 'Forms' immanent in 'Experience'--Mathematics in Sensibility, Logic in the Understanding--but continues the tradition by defining 'Experience' as Cognitive. Peirce begins to discover their Practical character, when he proposes that they are both fundamentally hypothetical operations. Dewey develops this operational conception of Mathematics and Logic, by showing how they are rooted in both technical and everyday problem-solving processes. But still, even for Dewey, even those everyday processes are primarily Cognitive. In contrast, in the Evolvemental concept of Experience, Mathematics and Logic are fundamentally immanent in Conduct--Mathematics, beginning with Ordinal Numbers, is abstracted from the sequential, cumulative nature of Conduct, while Logic is abstracted from the connectivity of Conduct, originating in the 'I' itself, the pivotal Middle Term between what one has just done, and what one is about to do.

Inference and Conduct

Logic is the study of Inference. Inference fundamentally connects two assertions, via a Middle Term, thereby generating a third assertion. It serves as a means of acquiring knowledge without needing to resort to observation. There are two main reasons for acquiring knowledge without reversion to observation. First, when observation is a possible alternative means of discovery, i. e. the facts are available, Inference is more efficient. But second, when facts are not available for observation, Inference is essential, and what cannot, in principle, be observed is what does not exist, especially the consequences of a possible Action under consideration. In other words, Inference is essential to decision-making, not merely as a producer of results in advance, but, as Dewey shows, as a guide of the investigative procedures, e. g. scientific experimentation, that yield those results. But the Evolvemental concept of Experience shows the role of Inference in any structured Conduct, not merely investigation. Inference is the source of order and connectivity in sequences of Action--it leads one from A to C via the Middle Term B, which is both the Consequent of A and the Antecedent of C. Furthermore, the ultimate Middle Term of Experience is the 'I' itself--the pivot between Propriation, i. e. the internalization of what one has just done, and Exposition, i. e. the externalization of what one is about to do.

Mill, Induction, and Morality

Just as Kant applies Deductive Logic to Morality, Mill applies Inductive Logic to it. He argues that 'X is desirable' is no more than an Inductive generalization of factual cases of X being desired. And, since what is ultimately desired, according to him, is Pleasure, 'X is Pleasing' = 'X is Good', and 'Good' means nothing more than that. Moore charges Mill with committing a 'Naturalistic Fallacy', i. e. with equating a 'natural' quality, Pleasure, with a non-'natural' one, Good. But Moore's charge is unnecessarily burdened by his potentially question-begging invocation of a Nature vs. non-Nature Platonistic Dualism. So, a more straightforward version of this line of criticism is that Mill confuses Fact and Value, that a Value cannot be derived from a Fact. Another is that what ought to be the case cannot be derived from what is the case. But, if Mill is steadfast, he can insist that non-Nature, Value, and Ought, are as much products of Induction from Nature, Fact, and Is, as Desirable is from Desired. Still, he faces a more formidable challenge from the internal limitations of Induction itself. Generalization can apply only to what has been the case, so Induction can present no grounds for asserting that Pleasure will continue to be what is desired, anymore than it can for deriving a possible future Fact from a past Fact or pattern of Facts. Furthermore, the behavioral regularity that Mill's Inductive Morality presumes upon cannot accommodate the Evolvemental thesis that Conduct is intrinsically a variation of what precedes it.

Induction and Material Implication

Deduction and Induction are typically distinguished by two contrasts. First, while Deduction is the derivation of a Particular from a Universal, Induction posits a Universal on the basis of observed Particular cases. Second, accordingly, Deduction proceeds with certainty, whereas Induction is, at best, only highly probable, i. e. because it cannot preclude the possibility of a future counter-example arising. Hume has suggested a third significant distinction. In Deduction, the certainty of its conclusion is an expression of its Objectivity, namely of a relation that inheres in the connected terms or statements. In contrast, on his analysis of the most prominent result of Inductive reasoning, namely Causality, a seeming Objective relation is actually only Subjective. For, he shows that while 'A causes B' seems to assert an Objective connection between A and B, it means no more than 'The perception of A has been regularly conjoined with the perception of B', a Subjective connection, regardless of how generally accepted the proposed Law might be. Kant's response to Hume is that this analysis overlooks a crucial Objective element--that in 'A causes B', the temporal precedence of A to B is inherent, independent of any perceptual experience, in which the order of A and B is arbitrary. This response to Hume sheds a similar light on the Modern Logic's Material Implication., in which 'If A, then B' is represented as 'not-(A and not-B). As has been discussed here previously, the latter formula abstracts from the Antecedent-Consequent ordering of the former, just as Humean Induction abstracts from the Objective temporal order of a Causal connection. Hence, Material Implication is basically Inductive, not Deductive, as it is generally presented. Furthermore, insofar as Material Implication is one of the cornerstones of Contemporary Logic, so too is the latter, as a whole. The notion that Contemporary Logic is fundamentally Inductive is consistent with its implicit Ontological Atomism, and is perhaps even better exposed by its concept of 'All', derived from Peirce's, meaning 'aggregation', not 'totality', as is the product of, e. g. the Formal Principle in an Ontology of Formaterial Systems.

Reason and Hypocrisy

One of the fundamental Principles of many Logics is the Law of Contradiction--assertions A and not-A cannot both be True. A main application of this Law is to assertions that imply both some assertion and its negation--if P implies both Q and not-Q, then P is False. So, a prominent way of proving that some assertion is True is to show that its negation leads to a Contradiction, a technique often known as a 'reduction ad absurdum' argument. Kant's ambition in developing a notion of Pure Practican Reason is based on his application of the Law of Contradiction to Conduct--if in a behavorial maxim, i. e. in 'in order to accomplish Q, do P', the means P would lead to not only Q, but to not-Q as well, then one is Morally obligated to not act on that maxim. For example, in the maxim, 'Lie about repayment, in order to secure a loan', repeated lying about repayment will eventually lead to loans being refused, so one is Morally obligated to not make false promises, according to the Kantian analysis. Such Practical Contradiction is not to be confused with either physical impossibility or Logical impossibility. Moving simultaneously to one's right and to one's left is physically impossible. On Spinoza's thesis that all behavior is self-preservative, suicide is Logically impossible, i. e. it can only be some outside destructive force that impels the hand to stab, shoot, take pills, etc. Furthermore, since Kant's analysis applies only to impersonal formulas, such as maxims, it has difficulty accommodating such intrapersonal conflicts as that between what one says and one does, between e. g. preaching marital fidelity and committing adultery. But in Evolvementalism, such behavioral inconsistencies violate the Principle of Idionomic integrity that is entailed by Individuality. In other words, Hypocrisy is a type of Irrational behavior, and, as undermining Individuality, has no Phronetic value in Evolvementalism.

Wisdom and Competence

For Plato and Aristotle, contemplation of the Good is a higher Good than the actualization of the Good, e. g. the contemplation of the idea of a perfect political state is a higher Good than the actualization of that idea. Since Wisdom is pre-eminently contemplative for them, Skill, namely, the knowledge of how to actualize an idea, is, therefore, for them, not essential to Wisdom. For Marx and Dewey, such a position expresses a leisure-class disdain for physical activity. For Formaterialism, it is an aspect of the traditional neglect of the Material Principle. Furthermore, on the Evolvemental model of experience, any End, Goal, Good, Intention, Aim, etc. functions first and foremost as a Formal Principle of Conduct, namely it shapes and guides Conduct. Hence, Knowledge of a Good is nothing more than knowing how, on the basis of a Good, to proceed in actualizing it. Therefore, Skill is, at minimum, an essential aspect of Wisdom.

Systems and Self-Exemplification

Peirce's classification of Logic as a species of Semiotic suggests one, perhaps a unique, perhaps an essential, characteristic of Philosophical Systems in general. Not only is his own Logic a species of Semiotic, but so too is everything that he writes, including his theory of Semiotics, subject to Semiotic analysis. So, more generally, a Philosophical System must account for itself. Aristotle's dislocation of 'thought thinking itself' from the rest of his Ethics, is a tacit acknowledgement that his Ethical System does not account for itself. In contrast, the Systems of Kant, and of those he most directly influences, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and the Pragmaticists, are all self-applying, whereas for Analytic Philosophy, 'self-referentiality' is no more than an abstract intellectual puzzle. Evolvementalism presumes itself to be self-exemplifying.

Conduct and the Disjunctive Syllogism

While the Modern algebraization of Logic is one main development of Aristotle's original conception of it, perhaps the key substantive alteration is the interpretation of Categorical statements as Hypothetical--'All P are Q' becomes understood as 'If X is P, then X is Q.' Accordingly, the Hypothetical Syllogism--'If ((if X is P, then X is Q, and (if X is Q, then X is R)), then (if X is P, then X is R)'--supplants the Categorical Syllogism--'All P are Q, all Q are R, therefore all P are R. For Peirce, this re-interpretation coheres with his theory of mental activity, which is fundamentally hypothetical. Dewey perhaps best fleshes out Peirce's insight, asserting that mental activity is fundamentally a means to the solution of a problem, and that hypothetical reasoning guides both the determination of the best means to an end, and the consideration of the further consequences of ends. But the Evolvemental conception of Conduct suggests that it is another Logical category that best captures the structure of the mental activity involved in conduct. At any instant of experience, an indefinite number of courses of action are possible, which demonstrates that framing any Conduct is a Disjunctive statement--I can do A, or B, or C, . . ., the resolution of which entails the Disjunctive Syllogism--A or B, not A, therefore B, towards the determination of which, hypothetical reasoning regarding each of the alternatives is directed. The Disjunctive Syllogism has traditionally been taken for granted, perhaps no more crucially so than by Kant. One of the fundamental features of his System is his assertion that Freedom and Pure Practical Reason are identical, and that the latter is expressed by the Categorical Syllogism--'Any Rational being would do A, I am a Rational being, therefor I will do A'--which is the essence of his 'Categorical Imperative'. However, he ultimately realizes, and his System never adequately accommodates, that this Syllogism does not explain why a being would choose to act Rationally, i. e. does not explain the possibility of a more fundamental Freedom, 'willkur', to choose, or, to not choose Rational Freedom ,'Wille'. What he encounters in this Systematic flaw is that the Disjunctive nature of mental activity as it pertains to Conduct, precedes either the Categoricality or Hypotheticality of any subsequent processes.

Logic and Semiotic

Peirce distinguishes between Logic 'proper', and Logic 'in general'. The former refers to the subject matter usually covered under the rubric 'Logic', while the latter he also calls 'Semiotic', or the 'Doctrine of Signs', and the former is a branch of the latter. While most Modern Logicians would agree that Modern Logic is fundamentally Symbolic Logic, few seem to share Peirce's insight that 'Symbolic Logic' means, first and foremost, not 'Logic expressed in symbolic terms', but, 'the Logic of Symbols'. Peirce's treatment of Logic, in the conventional sense, as one of many systems of Signs, anticipates Wittgenstein's conceiving it as one of many 'language games', except that unlike Wittgenstein, he offers a systematization of those 'games'. More generally, Semiotic is for Peirce interrelated with his Theory of Mind, which is interrelated with his theory of Conduct. In other words, Logic for him is an unprivileged part of a general System, and, so, hardly the 'essence of Philosophy', as Russell has asserted. What is, instead, at least implicitly essential to Peirce is the Systematic nature of Philosophy. Now, Formaterialism makes 'Systematics', for want of a better term, explicitly essential to Philosophy, because it holds that everything that exists is some combination of the Formal Principle and the Material Principle, and every such combination constitutes a 'System'. Furthermore, every System has a 'Complexity', so Systems can be evaluated on the basis of greater or lesser Complexity. Since Russell, and Analytic Philosophy, in principle, eschew Complexity, from the perspective of Formaterialism, Peirce, and Pragmatism, especially Dewey's, present a System that is greater than Analytic Philosophy.

Whitehead

Among Analytic Philosophers who are familiar with Principia Mathematica, many are aware that Russell had a co-author, and of those, some seem to know that the co-author, Whitehead has first billing. While it is probably impossible to distinguish the contribution of each to that work, their other efforts in the period suggest that Principia is a combination of Whitehead's neo-Leibnizian 'Universal Algebra' and Russell's Logical Atomism. The marginalization of Whitehead regarding this effort is of a piece with that regarding his subsequent projects, some of which are dismissed as 'not Philosophy' by some Analytic Philosophers. But less insular thinkers recognize his later Process and Reality as one of the seminal works of the twentieth-century. Process and Reality reflects the influence on Whitehead of Leibniz, Bergson, and Alexander--just as Alexander introduces Bergsonian Flux into Spinoza's System, Whitehead similarly re-constructs Leibniz' Monadology, with a subsequent impact in Philosophy, Psychology, and Philosophy of Science that has been outside the purview of mainstream academic Philosophy. The notions here of the Formal Principle, in general, and of Propriation, in particular, are directly indebted to Whitehead's notion 'Concrescence'. Where Formaterialism most fundamentally diverges from Whitehead's System is in its recognition of the Material Principle, in general, and Exposition, in particular, the lack of which in Whitehead's System leaves no account of the initiation of Concrescence, hence, leaving an account of Human Experience which is entirely passive. Furthermore, his System includes, aside from Process, and the Reality that Process generates, a third fundamental element, 'Eternal Objects', which are his version of Platonic Forms--subsisting outside of Concrescences, but having 'ingress' into them. Among the Eternal Objects are Numbers, so Process and Reality continues the thesis of Principia that Numbers are fundamentally Cardinal and immutable. Formaterialism rejects wholesale the notion of Eternal Objects, and finds in Concrescence the grounds of an Ordinal Theory of Number that suffices for a general Theory of Number.

Voting and Privacy

One of the fundamental Rights in the U. S. Democracy is voting privacy. The justification for such protection is obvious--if how someone voted were known to others, one might be subject to retribution, and the entire institution of voting would be a function of threats and promises. However, the existence of this Right to Privacy can confuse the nature of the act of voting itself. It can lead to the impression that voting is a private matter, an expression of merely personal feelings that are of no concern to anybody else, of the status of e. g. one's liking for broccoli. But, first of all, who one votes for is of concern to, not just somebody else, but to everybody else, because the consequences of that vote bear on everybody else. Hence, the reasons for a vote are a public concern, for which there is no codified protection. So, in a familiar example from past U. S. elections, one's voting for someone on the basis of 'with which candidate would one prefer to have a beer', is justifiably of concern to others. In a more Evolved Democracy, voting privacy would no longer be necessary. Under current circumstances, cultivation of the public conscientiousness of voters, e. g. inculcation of the notion that voting is a means to the general good, not a private venting, would constitute a significant Evolvement.

Implication and Ordinality

One of the central principles of Analytic Philosophy, the predominant school of academic American Philosophy, is Russell's thesis 'Logic is the essence of Philosophy'. Now, if Logic is the essence of Philosophy, then its treatment of one of its key connectives, Material Implication, is also of that essence. In that Logic, Material Implication, 'If P, then Q', is represented as either a Conjunction, 'Not-(P and not-Q)', or a Disjunction 'P or not-Q', which are equivalent in the System. Representing Material Implication either way suits the systematic requirement that every compound Proposition has a Truth-Value that is computed in terms of the Truth-Values of its constituents. As has been well-documented here and elsewhere, the resultant Truth-Computation of interpreting Implication as either Conjunction or Disjunction includes peculiarities such as--'If Mars is Earth, then a tree is a frog' is True. So, one feature of Analytic Philosophy is that technical coherence is more important than common-sense, which would not make it alone amongst Philosophical Systems. But one significant distinction between the 'If-then' construction and Conjunction and Disjunction is that the latter two are symmetrical relations, whereas the former is not, i. e. whereas the order of P and Q in 'P and Q' or in 'P or Q' is irrelevant, it is essential in 'If P, then Q'. In other words, this interpretation of Implication arbitrarily trivializes the distinction between Antecedent and Consequent, which bespeaks a fundamental inadequacy to Ordinality, i. e. Sequentiality, and which raises the further question of how this Logic can elsewhere insist on a distinction between Axioms and Theorems, i. e. between primitive and derived Truths. So, if inadequacy to Ordinality is a fundamental characteristic of this Logic, then it is of the essence of Philosophy, on Russell's thesis. But, there are Philosophical Systems, including Evolvementalism, in which Ordinality is an essential feature. Hence, a more accurate version of Russell's thesis is 'OUR Logic is the essence of OUR Philosophy', a qualification of its Principle to which Analytic Philosophy sometimes expresses obliviousness.

Peirce and Logic

Seemingly unrecognized in American academic Philosophy is the fact that Peirce, also the father of Semiology and Pragmatism, was at least is seminal as is Frege in the development of Modern Logic. A fundamental insight of Peirce's is that while Logic studies the drawing of Inference, Mathematics is an exemplary drawer of Inference. His Logic is, therefore, a refinement of Mathematics, without the latter being a branch of the former. More specifically, the main elements of his Logic are Mathematical, a project already initiated by especially Boole, who derives the Logical connectives Negation, Conjunction, and Disjunction from the Mathematical notions Negative, Multiplication, and Addition. But Peirce makes the more significant leap, linking the new Logic to the Aristotelian, by deriving Implication from Less Than, All from Multiplication, and Some from Addition. Though Frege's innovations slightly predated him, Peirce's independently-developed notation is plainly the one adopted by subsequent Logicians. Peirce also explains how Mathematics can be abstract without being a reification of processes such as counting--it is implicitly hypothetical, namely 'a+b=c' means 'if b of any unit is added to a of the same unit, then there will result a total of c of that unit'. Hence, to Peirce, Mathematics is Pragmatic, i. e. operational, in a dynamic sense. Dewey, therefore, draws the appropriate conclusion from Peirce's conceptions of the nature of Mathematics, and of the relation of Mathematics to Logics, by defining Logic as a Theory of Inquiry, specifically of experimental inquiry, the predominant type of knowledge-acquisition of this era. Hence, Pragmatism manages to integrate Logic with practical activity without diminishing its abstract nature. Many American academic Philosophers not only regard Russell as the greatest contemporary Philosopher, but are barely familiar with Peirce. But if comprehensiveness of systematic vision is the criterion of greatness, Russell is the lesser of the two.

Wittgenstein and Idionomy

Wittgenstein wrote two major Philosophical works in his career. In the earlier, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, he develops a Theory of Language based on the pre-eminence of Language functioning as a mirror of the logical structure of reality. Because this canonical concept of Language makes an important contribution to the efforts of Russell, notably, to Logicize not merely Mathematics, but Philosophy, in general, Wittgenstein was embraced as a star of this Analytic Philosophy. However, after decades of silence, Wittgenstein returned with the culmination of his interim research, Philosophical Investigations, which stunningly repudiates the main thesis of the Tractatus, and, hence, of Analytic Philosophy, in general. Language is now no longer defined in terms of a Logical ideal, but is rather conceived as a function of how it is used in differing existential contexts, only one of which is Logical activity, and none of which has privileged status. His term 'Language Games' describes the various types of modes of functioning of Language, making it easy to classify this later Wittgenstein as a 'Pragmatist', to which some Analytic Philosophers have not taken too kindly. Evolvementalism sees in the arc of Wittgenstein's career a turn from Theory to Practice that parallels Kant's epochal transition. In particular, one of Wittgenstein's central themes in the Investigations, 'following a rule', helps clarify the Kantian notion of Autonomy, i. e. acting on a self-imposed Principle. But Wittgenstein goes further--the rules, the following of which he analyzes, are not merely self-subsistent, as is Kant's 'Principle of Pure Practical Reason'. Rather, those rules, notably the Laws of Logic and of Mathematics, are constructed by Logicians and Mathematicians, and the respect for them is based on their continued efficacy and fruitfulness. This following of a rule that one has constructed for oneself is what in Evolvementalism is called 'Idionomy', an Evolvemental advance in Human Freedom.

Formal and Material Implication

Modern Logic distinguishes between 'Formal' Implication and 'Material' Implication. Formal Implication, a key component of the Modern interpretation of Aristotelian Categorical statements, asserts a relation of inclusion to obtain between predicates, e. g. (x)(If x is F, then x is G). On the other hand, Material Implication, asserts the existence of a propositional connection between actual states-of-affairs, e. g. If P is True, then Q is True. Now, this Formal-Material contrast has little to do with the meaning of those terms in Formaterialism. Rather, the Logical connective that is closest to the Formal Principle is Conjunction, while that closest to the Material Principle is Disjunction, specifically the Exclusive variety. But the more the general problem is accepting Material Implication as a species of Implication. For both Aristotle and Modern Logicians, the medium of Implication is Universals, whereas the propositions connected by Material Implication are Singular states-of-affairs. The associated peculiarities of the Truth-Computation of this connective are well-known. When P is True and Q is False, 'If P, then Q' is plainly False. But a lacuna arises when P is False, one which Logicians have opted to fill with the blanket computation that 'If P, then Q' is True whenever P is False. Because Material Implication, and this method of its Truth-Computation, is a foundation of much of contemporary Logic, and is a staple of academic Introductory Logic courses, students are, therefore, expected to puzzle out how 'If Earth is Mars, then Belgium is a tree' is a True statement, one that is part of what is meant to teach them how to recognize rhetorical double-talk.

Zero

The Formaterial thesis that Ordinal Numbers are more fundamental than Cardinals, entails that '0' is no more than a conventional device within the Cardinal System, with no substantive experiential correlate. For example, a '0' bank account balance does not refer to something subsisting in the account, but is only an abbreviated caution that one cannot make any further payments at the time. Now, there is no question that the fruitfulness and efficiency of 0 justifies its intra-Systemic status, but there are anomalies involving it even within the construction. For example, every well-formed Number in the System should have a unique value, but what is the value of 0/0? On the basis of 'n/n=1', 0/0=1; on the basis of '0/n=0', it=0; and, on the basis of 'n/0=Infinity', it=Infinity. Any choice would be arbitrary, so would only amount to a gloss over an incompleteness in the System. Still, the treatment of 0 by Frege and Russell suggest that they regard it as sufficiently well-grounded to serve as a foundation of the Number System. They define it as 'the Class of all empty Classes', and they posit it as the first, or perhaps 'zeroth' would be more appropriate, Number. But its presumed well-groundedness implies a derivation from some experiential element, and what a 'Class' might be, outside of an intellectual construction, is unclear. Furthermore, Russell's own assiduous analysis elsewhere, of phrases like 'the present King of France', would seem to commit him to the position that an 'empty Class' is no Class at all, a nonentity, predicating anything of which would constitute a False proposition. Hence, the Cardinal Number System that is generated on the basis of 0, is a construction, one that does not represent a refutation of the thesis of the priority of the Ordinals. Mathematicians need not be concerned about the existential significance of the Ordinal-Cardinal relation, but Philosophers who presume their Logic to be Universalistic, should be.

Infinity

One of the exotic features of modern Mathematics is Infinity--it is a specific Cardinal Number, with its own unique symbol ('8' rotated 90 degrees), it refers to specific quantities, e. g. how many odd Integers there are, and it has operational uses in both pure Mathematics and e. g. in Physics, in the construction 'approaches Infinity'. As such, Infinity proves its usefulness. However, many Mathematicians, including some Philosophers, go further, and accord Ontological significance to Infinity, as if it were the gateway to some supernatural realm that is located at the top of a stairway or a ladder, thereby losing sight of the fact that e. g. 'approaches Infinity' really means 'keeps becoming larger'. But Ontological Infinity is an entrance only to absurdity. For example, if Infinity is an actual Cardinal Number, which one is it? Any Number System already guarantees a name and symbol for every Number that might arise, so at what juncture does the Number Infinity emerge? Or, as is plainer in terms of Ordinal Numbers, when does counting arrive at the Infinitieth item, e. g. when will McDonald's sell its Infinitieth hamburger? The fundamental problem, glossed over even by some who are otherwise meticulous about deriving linguistic terms from concrete experience, is, of course, that 'Infinity' is nothing but a reification of the attribute 'infinite'. Now, there seems to be no debating that the Number series is intrinsically Infinite, in which case it achieves 'Infinity' at every point of the series, not at some distant moment. Hence, the positing of a specific Number Infinity in that series, in fact, finitizes the series. Such finitizing of the infinite is an expression of a chronic Metaphysical prejudice, namely, the priority of Unity and its cognates, over Multiplicity and its cognates, a prejudice from which even Logical Atomism does not detach itself. One of the purposes of Formaterialism is to codify the irreducibility of Diversification to Homogenization, and, so, it rejects the Ontologization of Infinity.

Abstraction and Use

A frequent challenge from Wittgenstein to Russell's Logicizing of Mathematics is raised by the question, 'What is its use?' Commentators have generally classified this challenge as a topic in Semantics, i. e. as debate with Russell's 'Extensionalist' Theory of Meaning, from the perspective of a 'Use' Theory of Meaning. Regardless of Wittgenstein's actual intentions, the question exposes a deeper methodological problem, regarding Abstraction, that is by no means peculiar to Russell. For example, in the 'Phenomenology' of Russell's contemporary, Husserl, the Phenomenological sphere is arrived at via an abstractive process which Husserl calls 'Epoche'. But, despite the inarguable fruitfulness of the subsequent Phenomenological descriptions, Husserl eventually encountered the limitations of his methodology later in his career, when attempting to apply it to the pre-Epoche sphere. Surprisingly, a generation of critics of Husserl--Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Derrida--never seem to target Epoche itself, so their criticisms remain circumscribed by that methodology. One, and possibly the most fundamental, problem with this Phenomenology is that it cannot represent the process of Epoche, which means that it has no applicablility to the pre-Epochal world. Russell's methods have an analogous problem--his Logical System cannot represent that process of Abstraction that opens the door to it, and, hence, its applicability to pre-Logical activities is problematic, as Wittgenstein has pinpointed. Hence, his Logic has no Systematic relation to his views on e. g. Ethics and Politics, a restrictiveness that it is unthinkable to not merely a Kant, but even to a Locke or a Hume. And, academic Analytic Philosophy has inherited Russellianism's limitation, often seeming more interested in making a virtue of its inefficacies, than in overcoming them. In contrast, Formaterialism attempts to accommodate not merely traditional processes of Abstraction, but its own as well, i. e. as modes of the Formal Principle, Becoming-the-Same. Hence, its scope of applicability is potentially greater than that of those traditional Systems.

Math and Logic

'Counting' can be, semi-formally, defined as 'n+1', i. e. the addition of 1 to any given Number. Likewise, 'is less than' can be defined as a relation between any n and n+1. Now, 'Inference' can be, semi-formally, defined as 'If n is less than n+1, and n+1 is less than (n+1)+1, then n is less than (n+1)+1. Now Counting is the fundamental operation of Mathematics, and Inference is the fundamental operation of Logic. Hence, as Wittgenstein has argued, Mathematics and Logic are two different 'language games', and as these examples demonstrate, Mathematics is irreducible to Logic, despite the eminent convoluted efforts to prove otherwise, and, likewise Logic is irreducible to Mathematics. In Formaterial terms, Mathematics is fundamentally a Material operation, i. e. a perpetual extension of a series, whereas is Logic is fundamentally Formal, i. e. is based on the Middle term of an Inference homogenizing a series of terms. This is not to assert that they are each purely one or the other, since they are obviously both elaborate combinations of both, like all Systems. The point, rather, is to isolate the essential feature of each, in order to highlight their essential difference.

Algebra and Logic

Contemporary Math Logics have varied in ambition. Some aim to systematize Mathematical processes, but others, the more prevalent types, aim to reduce Mathematics to a branch of Logic. Perhaps the most authoritative critic of the latter effort is Wittgenstein, who was a prominent advocate of Logicist Mathematics before repudiating the project. He characterizes Mathematics and Logic as two different 'language games', and observes that the attempt to reduce the former to the latter does not merely not illuminate Mathematics, but, rather, tends to cloud its operations. A further analysis of the 'Logic' that is the basis of such reduction notices that its central element is the Variable, used to mediate between Universal formulas and their instances. In other words, this 'Logic' is Algebraized language, perhaps the fulfillment of Leibniz' dream of a Universal language. Now, as much as Contemporary Logic is touted as a significant improvement over Aristotelian Syllogistics, it remains within the scope of the latter, namely within the Universal-Particular relation. So, as 'Universal' as this 'Logic' presumes itself to be, its Particularism cannot accommodate Logics of either Autonomy, e. g. Kantianism, or of Idionomy, e. g. Existentialism or Evolvementalism.

Mathematics: Analytic or Synthetic?

A central debate in Mathematical Logic is whether Mathematical propositions are 'Analytic', or 'Synthetic'. In an 'Analytic' proposition, the predicate is included in the subject, e. g. 'My sister is female' is Analytic, because 'female' is included in the definition of 'sister'. In a 'Synthetic' proposition, the predicate is not included in the subject, e. g. 'My sister is brunette'. Traditionally, Mathematical propositions have been considered Analytic, because, e. g. in '7+5=12', '12' is included in the definitions of '7', '5', and '+' when conjoined, but Kant has notably argued that they are not, so that such propositions are Synthetic. Contemporary Math Logic has gone to elaborate lengths to demonstrate how all Mathematical operations are derived from the definitions of their elements alone. But a Kantian can easily argue, in response, that any 'Successor Function' is Synthetic, so to whatever extent the latter is essential to such systems, and they do all seem to rely on it to generate the Numbers, these Logics only demonstrate that Mathematics is indeed Synthetic. In Formaterialism, Becoming-Multiple, and Becoming-Integrated are distinct processes, and '+' and '=' are examples of each, respectively. Hence, in any A+B=C, =C is not included in A+B, so 'A+B=C' is Synthetic, e. g. before adding 5 oranges to 7 apples can equal anything, a further process of integration, e. g. homogenizing the two groups as both 'fruit', is required. Since simple Arithmetic is the basis of Mathematics, Mathematical propostions are all Synthetic.

Kant and Anthropology

Kant's 'Critical' project--Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, and Critique of Judgement--is mandala-like. For, its labyrinthine innovativeness, with no explicitly stated focus, has bred widely divergent interpretations, each claiming primogeniture. The closest Kant comes to a statement of purpose in the body of the works is to explain that he is attempting to answer three questions, 'What can I know?', 'What ought I to do?', and 'What may I hope?', the main topics of each of the Critiques, respectively. In a later work, he finally summarizes the three in the ultimate question, 'What is man?' He classifies this question as 'Anthropology', virtually a neologism at the time, but he has something other in mind than what the term has subsequently come to indicate, an empirical study of e. g. diverse cultures. Rather, he is indicating that his Critical project is attempting a definition of Humanity that is not, as had traditionally been the case, derived from some transcendent premise, e. g. from divine being, natural teleology, etc. As such, Kant is fulfilling the project initiated by the Cartesian premise 'I think', and foreruns further refinements, such as Nietzsche's 'Human All-too-Human" and Heidegger's 'Analytic of Dasein'. Kant's advance from a Particularist definition of Humanity to an Autonomous concept, constitutes not merely an intellectual Evolvement, but an Evolvement in Humanity itself.