Wednesday, September 30, 2009

Supererogatory Action

Some prominent Moral theories, notably Kant's, are 'Deontological', meaning, based on what one 'ought' to do. The 'ought' is generally conceived to be an impersonal requirement to perform a type of action classified as a 'Duty'. So, a 'Duty' is what anyone ought to do, and, hence, 'Goodness' consists in behaving Dutifully. One chronic problem for Deontology is 'Supererogatory' action, namely action that 'goes beyond the call of duty'. The problem is that if 'good' behavior='dutiful' behavior, Supererogatory action, e. g. heroism, has no Moral value, a significant shortcoming for a theory that means to accommodate all instances of praiseworthy activity. Some Deontologists have, following the conceptual logic of their Principle, gone so far as to deny the very possibility of 'Supererogatory' action. But, if there is a conceptual problem involved, it lies with their commitment to Universalizability as the criterion of Goodness, which cannot recognize differences in Individual capacities, e. g. that one person's heroism might be beyond the strength of another. So, Evolvementalism argues, to the contrary, that it is Dutiful Conduct that lacks Phronetic worth, because, 'doing what anyone should' is inadequate as an Idionomic Principle, and, furthermore, that any Idionomic motivation is beyond what 'anyone should do'. Hence, Evolvemental Phronetics is intrinsically Supererogatory.

Tuesday, September 29, 2009

Axiology

'Axiology' is the study of Value, and Philosophy has traditionally recognized three Values--Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, with the relations between the three open to further analysis. The branches of Philosophy that study these are Logic, Morality/Ethics, and Aesthetics, respectively. In Morality and Ethics, there have been four main positions on the nature of Goodness, which can be called 'Realism', 'Naturalism', 'Instrumentalism', and 'Emotivism'. 'Realism', e. g. Plato, believes that 'The Good' names a realm or entity that exists in itself. 'Naturalism', e. g. Aristotle, believes that 'Good' refers to some characteristic of the natural world. 'Instrumentalism', e. g. Spinoza, believes that 'a good' is something that promotes well-being. And, 'Emotivism', e. g. Stevenson, believes that 'good' is simply an expression of approval. The nature of the traditional opposite of 'Good', namely 'Evil', correspondingly varies according to position. For example, Nietzsche's phrase 'Beyond Good and Evil', often interpreted as a commitment to Immoralism, is actually a critique of Realism, in the name of Instrumentalism, for which he uses the 'Good' vs. 'Bad' pair. Despite the differences in the four positions, one traditional commonality is that they are all 'positive', in the grammatical sense of the term, i. e. 'is good' is a one-place predicate. In contrast, Evolvemental Phronetics is fundamentally comparative, namely, is an evaluation of possible Actions with respect to one another, in terms of greater or lesser degree of Evolvement. Thus, its Axiology is Naturalistic, but its central notion is the 'Better' vs. 'Worse' comparison. Likewise, 'Best'='Better than any possible alternative'='The greatest degree of Evolvement possible'. Hence, Phronetics, as the determination of Best Conduct, describes the course of Action that, under the circumstances, entails the greatest degree of Evolvement.

Monday, September 28, 2009

Selfishness and Altruism

A recurring Moral debate concerns the possibility of Altruism. As the standard argument goes: All behavior is self-interested. Altruism is the benefitting of someone else. Therefore, Altruism is impossible. Instead, according to this analysis, any act that benefits another must have some ulterior selfish motive, either simply to experience a pleasant feeling, or that it is a means to some selfish end. This argument has been especially integral to political positions that reject the legitimacy of collectivist claims. As a result, those positions can only interpret any constraining Moral Principle, e. g. the Golden Rule, adversarially. Even the feeling of Sympathy, which has been advanced by even Adam Smith as the basis of Morality, is still a private experience that has no authority over those in whom it is lacking. Plainly, the foundation of the argument is the Psychological thesis that all behavior is self-interested. Now, certainly, some behavior is, but, on the other hand, it seems difficult to classify a parent's instinctual sacrifice for a child as 'selfish'. Furthermore, two of the most historically influential articulations of the thesis have been misconstrued--it was originally advanced by Hobbes and Smith in the spirit of democratization, i. e. to counter the Psychological premises of the time that buttressed the era's social hierarchy, e. g. the innateness of Nobility, not to fragment society. Still, its effectiveness as a social atomizer has been undeniable. In contrast, the Formaterial concept of the Individual rejects that Psychological thesis, because it entails that gregariousness, and, hence, Other-interestedness, is intrinsic in the Individual. And, the Evolvemental Phronetic Principle rejects the mutual exclusivity of Selfishness and Altruism: Conduct that is exclusively one or the other is simply of a narrower scope than that which integrates elements of both, and, hence, is less Evolved than the latter. Thus, this Principle agrees with Utilitarianism to the extent that the Phronetic value of Conduct is measured by degree of scope, not by type.

Sunday, September 27, 2009

Autonomy and Idionomy

'Autonomy' has been a prominent notion in Moral Thoery since Kant's attempt to equate Autonomous and Moral Conduct. His 'Fundamental Principle of Pure Practical Reason', better, but less adequately, known as the 'Categorical Imperative', challenges the long tradition that asserts that all human behavior is insuperably subject to irrational instincts, e. g. fear of punishment, hope for reward. Since such behavior is ultimately merely mechanical, it hardly deserves to be classified as 'Moral', according to Kant. Instead, for him, Morality must be autonomous, and only acting out of respect for one's own Rational nature qualifies as such. The latter, more specifically, entails the free obedience to the Principle 'Act only on such a maxim that you can at the same time will to be a universal law.' But, such a notion of 'Autonomy'--the free choice to submit to impersonal authority--has seemed to many to be a paradoxical interpretation of a word defined as 'self-rule'. Now, the Phronetic Principle, 'Evolve as much as possible', likewise entails self-motivation, i. e. Conduct that is the enactment of an Intention that explicitly takes one's own Past as a prelude. But, the Evolvement that it prescribes remains within the locus of Individual experience, i. e. a transition from one stage of accomplishment to another. Hence, to avoid confusion with Kant's ambitions, though 'Autonomous' does, strictly speaking, describe Individual Evolvement, I have coined the stucturally equivalent 'Idionomous' to characterize the latter instead. In contrast with Kantian Autonomy, Evolvemental Idionomy is, as I have earlier discussed, more completely Individualistic.

Saturday, September 26, 2009

The Phronetic Principle

Whitehead has described the history of Philosophy as a series of 'footnotes to Plato'. If so, then it may be time for a new chapter, if not a new book. Plato is an advocate of what I have called the 'Humpty Dumpty' cosmogonic paradigm, namely, that human existence is the product of a catastrophic cosmic fragmentation. This is a paradigm that transcends Plato's influence, because it informs virtually every religious and ideological doctrine hitherto, e. g. the 'Fall'. Consequently, these doctrines are, furthermore, fundamentally programs that aim to 'put Humpty back together again'. Two specific intellectual expressions of the commitment to such a paradigm are, therefore, first, the denigration of the disruptions of Unity, i. e. Multiplicity, Plurality, Diversity, etc., and, second, that the function of Phronetic enterprises such as 'Ethics' and 'Morality' is to correct Multiplicity, etc. in all their manifestations, e. g. divergence from societal norms. But the emergence of Evolutionary Theory presents a challenge to the Humpty Dumpty model, namely the Evolvemental paradigm, which is a development from lesser to greater complexity. So, first, since Complexity entails Diversity, the traditional denigration of the latter and related concepts is also rejected, e. g. Becoming-Diverse is a fundamental Systematic Principle. Second, with no pre-inscribed ideal of Unity, e. g. the pre-Fall Humpty Dumpty, Evolvement has no implicit telos governing it, and, is, hence, essentially indefinite. Finally, therefore, the fundamental function of Practical Wisdom, rather than to correct wayward behavior, is to promote Individual Evolvement. Hence, the Phronetic Principle is 'Evolve as much as possible'.

Friday, September 25, 2009

Relativism and Subjectivism

Two traditional Moral positions that are often confused can be called 'Relativism' and 'Subjectivism'. 'Relativism' holds that the best Conduct for one person might not be that for another. 'Subjectivism' asserts that one is always the best judge of what is one's best Conduct. Now, while some cases might be both Relativistic and Subjectivistic, others are not. The most historically prominent example of their divergence is Aristotle's principle 'Act in Moderation', which is Relativistic, but not Subjectivistic, for, e. g. what might be Courageous for one person might be Reckless for someone less physically robust. In other words, Relativism does not preclude an objective criterion being the ground of evaluation, nor an observer being qualified to offer someone competent advice on what to do. The source of the confusion lies in the notion that any 'Moral' Conduct must be principled, i. e. must be based on some formula that is applicable in all cases. Hence, Morality must be Universalistic, which some Moralists interpret as 'impersonal'. So, since neither Relativism nor Subjectivism abstract from the personal, those Moralists conflate them as indifferently 'Immoral'. But, the measure of the soundness of a Principle is its comprehensiveness--how many distinct cases it can apply to--which is a function of both scope and precision of formulation. In other words, more precise formulation is the mark of the superiority of a Principle. Hence, the inability to distinguish Relativism, which Aristotle demonstrates to be Universalistic, from Subjectivism, is an expression of an inferior Moral Principle.

Thursday, September 24, 2009

Phronetics and Action

In the Formaterial System, the Formal and Material Principles are of equal value, so, likewise, Propriation and Exposition, and e. g. Reflection and Locomotility, are of equal value in the Individual. In other words, the bearer of Phronetic value in the System is Evolvement, i. e. a way that Propriation and Exposition combine. In contrast, traditional Moralities have been based on the denigration, if not neglect, of Diversification. For, they are ultimately programs designed to correct presumed human imperfection, with static Unity as their criterion of Perfection. So, their determinations of the Moral Value of an act must abstract from the very performance of an Action, which is the Becoming-Diverse of the performer, and is, therefore, antithetical to their Ideal. But, where Evolvement is a governing Principle, Diversification is an essential ingredient in that Principle, which means that one's performance of an Action is not merely not antithetical to Phronetic Value, but its ultimate bearer.

Wednesday, September 23, 2009

Morality and Act

Kant's Moral Theory is based on his insight that there is a meaningful Moral difference between, for example, helping someone as a means to getting help in return, and doing so simply for its own sake. Hence, he concludes, Moral worth ultimately attaches to the intention behind an act. Mill, however, argues that unintentionally helping someone is preferable to intending to help someone, but failing in the attempt. Hence, he counters that the ultimate determinant of Moral value is the consequences of an act, the amount of happiness that an act effects. In contrast with both these prominent modern Moral Philosophers, Biblical Morality ultimately attaches worth to the type of act some event is, e. g. whether or not an acquisition is classified as 'stealing'. So, perhaps only Aristotle, among history's influential Ethicists, finds significance in the performance itself of an act--whether or not it is performed in Moderation. Furthermore, what, according to his Theory, constitutes 'Moderation' in every instance is relative to the capacities of the performer, e. g. what might be an act of Courage for one person might be one of Recklessness for someone less physically robust. In other words, a locus of Ethical significance for Aristotle is the performance an act itself, i. e. an episode in the life of a specific person. Such performances are 'Virtuous', according to Aristotle, but, as he later argues, they are examples of merely Practical Virtue, which he eventually subordinates to Theoretical Virtue, a type of Virtue which is not conditioned by the capacities of its bearer. So, the traditional Moral evaluation of an act is, despite the variety of approaches, in general a circumvention of the performance itself of an act.

Tuesday, September 22, 2009

Varieties of Morality

The ordinary use of the term 'Morality' in contemporary public discourse would suggest its univocality, but today's political struggles testify to the contrary. The sides in those conflicts represent two prevalent Moral principles, 'Obey the Scriptures' and 'Do Unto Others as You Would Have Them Do Unto You'. Now, there are some who might argue that these two amount to the same thing, but advocates on both sides would respond that that would gloss over their crucial, irreconcilable distinction--the source of the former is God, while the latter makes humans the measure of all Moral things. Furthermore, anyone familiar with the History of Ethics can discern the influence of other Philosophical theories on everday affairs. The Utilitarian 'Greatest Happiness for the Greatest Number' precept is probably the guiding principle behind Economic policy. Notions such as 'It is the thought that counts' and 'What if everybody were to do that?' are derived from Kantianism. And, 'Act in moderation' comes from Aristotle. Also, the Ethical theory of the latter, traditionally classified as 'Eudaemonism', i. e. because it recognizes Happiness as the highest principle, is one of several that can be generalized as 'self-interest' doctrines, including 'Hedonism' and 'Egoism'. That there is little common contemporary recognition that the latter constitute legitimate Theories, is perhaps today's single greatest Moral problem. For, with the U. S. Constitution guaranteeing 'The Pursuit of Happiness', but the latter not recognized as a Moral principle, the main contemporary schism is not that between 'Religion' and 'Secularism', nor that between everyday Morality and Philosophical Ethics, but that between the Politico-Economic and the Moral spheres.

Monday, September 21, 2009

Certainty and Uncertainty

As Dewey has argued, much of traditional Philosophy can be construed as a 'quest for certainty', which entails that Certainty is its highest principle. Descartes is the most obvious exemplar of an advocate of the principle, but so too is a 'Skeptic' such as Hume, for whom sense impressions are no less certain than the thought 'I am' is for the former. The traditional priority of Theory over Practice is based on the potential certitude of the former and the uncertainty of the latter. For example, the priority of Sophia over Phronesis for Aristotle is based on the Certainty to be achieved in the self-sufficiency of 'thought thinking it itself', as opposed to the indeterminacies entailed in any physical activity. Dewey's thesis would also explain the most influential of modern Moral Theories--Kantianism and Utilitarianism. The foundation of the former is the motive behind an act, while of the latter, the feeling that is the effect of an act, both moments of Certainty in an otherwise indeterminate flux of processes. And, the thesis would explain any aversion to questionability and to choice, both of which entail uncertainty. Now, the specific purpose of Dewey's project is to promote Pragmatism, namely, following Peirce's 'Fallibilism', to replace Certainty with Probability as an Epistemological principle. He therefore bypasses the more comprehensiving challenge to Certaintism, namely that Uncertainty is as valued in human activity as Certainty is, i. e. that novelty, adventure, risk, and Freedom of Choice, for example, all entail Uncertainty.

Sunday, September 20, 2009

Freedom and Choice

The part of speech most commonly associated with Kantian Morality is the Imperative, but perhaps another plays a more fundamental role--the Interrogative. As Kant himself explains it, his Moral theory is a response to the question 'What ought I to do?'. His response, 'Do what the Categorical Imperative commands' suggests not merely an answer to the question, but a permanent stifling of it. Nevertheless, he falls short of a systematic elimination of a 'Will' that is free to choose against that 'unconditional' Imperative, which suggests the essentiality of questionability to Phronetics. The ground of that questionability is not intrinsic 'Freedom' per se, as Sartre, notably, argues. Rather, Freedom derives from the possibility of alternatives, with respect to which there is Freedom of Choice. Sartre may insist that we are 'condemned to be free', but his is a 'Freedom from', not a 'Freedom to', which presupposes alternatives. More generally, where Freedom of Choice is not dismissed as illusory, e. g. Spinoza, the traditional explanation of the existence of Choice derives from the presence of the alternatives of 'Good' and 'Evil' that always confront everybody. However, that pair's implicit predetermination of preference is tantamount to a suppression of Choice. In contrast, in the Formaterial System, Diversification is indefinitely multiple, and Action entails Diversification. Hence, the possibility of alternatives is intrinsic to Action, and to the source of the question 'What should I do?'.

Saturday, September 19, 2009

Phronetics

I am coining 'Phronetics' to mean 'the study of best Conduct'. The term derives from the Greek 'phronesis', meaning 'practical wisdom'. Phronesis is a notion that might be most notable for its neglect in the Philosophical tradition, beginning with Aristotle's subordination of it to 'Sophia', meaning 'theoretical wisdom', as part of his designation of Contemplation as the Highest Good. A critique of the traditional prioritizing of the latter has already been discussed here, so not merely the subordination of Phronesis to Sophia, but the traditional separation itself of Theory and Practice is rejected here. Phronesis treats approximately the same questions as what traditionally appear under the rubrics 'Ethics' or 'Morality', but the need to get clear of the centuries of confusions and distracting connotations that have become attached to those terms motivates the neologism. For example, the contemporary loose interchangeability of 'Ethics' and 'Morality' obscures an important distinction. The latter derives from the Latin 'mores', meaning 'practices', so 'Morality' is most precisely concerned with acts considered impersonally, e. g. the Ten Commandments. On the other hand, the former is from the Greek meaning 'habits' and 'character', e. g. Aristotle's Ethics is a character-building program. In contrast with both, Phronetics is more choreography than God-appeasement, and can entail the breaking of habit as much as the creating of one.

Friday, September 18, 2009

Conduct and Judgement

No mere explanation or analysis of behavior, the evaluation of Conduct seems to be a universal human phenomenon. Any disagreement involved primarily concerns the source of judgement, with God, Feeling, and Reason being the most prominent candidates, discussed usually under the rubrics of 'Morality' or 'Ethics'. Perhaps the first truly critical eye turned on the topic was Nietzsche's, beginning with his insight that Moral judgement is itself a behavioral act. This helps lead him to the theory that all phenomena, including judgemental acts, are expressions of the 'Will to Power', which enables him to distinguish between judgements that are acts of self-mastery, and those that are attempts to control or even attack others, between 'Master Morality' and 'Slave Morality', respectively. The exposure of the various manifestations of the latter type, especially Christian morality as he understood it, is the main focus of his mature period. So, perhaps because of his untimely permanent debilitation, he never gets to a thorough discussion of how judgement is a mode of Self-Mastery. If he had, he might have come to the realization that the 'Good vs. Bad' dualism by which he all-too-briefly characterizes the processes of Self-Mastery, is itself a relic of the Slave Morality that he sought to overcome.

Thursday, September 17, 2009

Individual Evolvement and Species Evolvement

Acting for the benefit of others is one type of Diversification of the Individual, and Diversification without loss of Unity is Evolvement, so benefiting others without disadvantage to oneself constitutes a process of Individual Evolvement. Thus, universal Individual Evolvement would effect social Unification, a 'Kingdom of Ends', as Kant puts it. Now, the generation of Individuals is the Diversification of the species, and, again, Diversification without loss of Unity constitutes Evolvement. Therefore, Individual Evolvement and species Evolvement are one and the same process, from different perspectives.

Wednesday, September 16, 2009

Individual and Society

The traditional definition of 'individual', ='distinct from others', inscribes in the 'individual' an antagonism to any collective interest that entails unity and order. Thus, for example, this 'individual' experiences 'Morality' as an imposition. Given this defintion, the abyss between personal and collective interests is probably best demonstrated by the recourse some 'individualists' have to an 'invisible hand' to bridge that abyss, a recourse which, unbeknownst to most of them, would not be endorsed by Adam Smith, for whom social cohesion is created by Sympathy. Others have proposed that sociality is prudent for the 'individual', but classifying the former as a 'necessary evil' only underscores its burdensomeness to the latter. And, some neo-Darwinians have changed tack in trying to reconcile the two sets of interests, by deriving the survival of a species from the fitness of its strongest members. But, this proposed bridge over the abyss has been proven to be as specious as the 'invisible hand', as the destructiveness of the collective by tyrants has repeatedly shown. In contrast, the etymologically accurate notion of 'Individual', ='undivided', entails no such sociopathy. To the contrary, internal coherence is a moment in both Propriation and Exposition: termination and initiation, respectively. And, since Exposition is the gregarious Principle of the Individual, the interests of the latter are not systematically antagonistic to those of the collective.

Tuesday, September 15, 2009

One's Ownmost

For millennia, 'Conscience' has been construed as a 'voice' that is both deeply private, and, yet, impersonal. In some theological traditions, its source is divine, while starting with Plato, one main Philosophical school has interpreted it as universal a priori knowledge that sometimes manages to cut through the clamor of everday personal experience. For example, for Kant, it is the command of Pure Practical Reason. In contrast, for Heidegger, its privacy, not its content, is the most telling characteristic of Conscience, indicating that it has a profoundly personal origin, and, so, is a 'call' by one's 'Ownmost', as he puts it. In his system, one's Ownmost is one's death, because, as he argues, one undergoes it entirely alone, so it functions as a corrective to experiences in which one is losing oneself in the external world of others. Sartre challenges Heidegger's judgement that a 'memento mori' qualifies as one's Ownmost, because, as he argues, death is the most impersonal of events, something that befalls everybody equally. Instead, because at every moment one's choices are absolutely free, in his view, what is one's Ownmost, for which one has inalienable responsibility, are those choices. However, he himself later concedes that need, notably hunger, can be such a powerful motivator that it can deprive one of one's freedom of choice, which implicitly undercuts his prior designation of the latter as one's Ownmost. Now, if Heidegger's Ownmost is a Future event, and Sartre's, at least at one stage, is in the Present, what is one's Ownmost for the Formaterial Individual is one's Past. One's Past is completely private and inviolable, and 'Conscience' is first and foremost a reminder of who one has hitherto been, i. e. of what one has hitherto been doing.

Monday, September 14, 2009

Exposition, Morality, and Transcendence

Perhaps the most typical and graphic concept of the Self in the Philosophical tradition is Leibniz' 'Monad'. He characterizes a Monad as 'windowless' because a Monad has no interaction with other Monads. Instead, a condition of pre-established harmony amongst Monads is the case in the Leibnizian universe, regarding which, each Monad can grasp via Reason. However, the image of 'window' distracts from the absence of any refernce to 'door' in the metaphor. The windowless Monad is a Propriative notion--Propriation seeks enclosure, and privacy. But in the Formaterial Individual, Propriation combines with Exposition, the latter being the Principle of risk and publicity. That the Individual fundamentally seeks both closure and novelty seems rarely accommodated in orthodox Psychological theories, despite being obvious in everyday experience. Exposition, which seeks to exit from the circumscription of Propriation, is the Principle of sociability and transcendence. In other words, the differences between the Spaces of Locomotility, of Morality, and of Transcendence, are ones of degree, not kind.

Sunday, September 13, 2009

Consciousness, Conscience, and Conscientiousness

'Consciousness', 'conscience', and 'conscientiousness' are etymologically similar words whose meanings have diverged, in common usage, to 'awareness of outer objects', 'the voice of Morality', and 'meticulousness', respectively. This divergence reflects a fragmentation in traditional Philosophical systems. In contrast, the Formaterial System unites them, as different aspects of Propriation: Consciousness is Reflective representation, Conscience, following Heidegger's Individualistic de-mystification, is its homeostatic ingredient, while Conscientiousness combines the other two, as can be best seen in an analysis of the Propriative aspect of Action. In the course of an Action, Consciousness monitors one's ongoing movements; Conscience is the reminder of what we are trying to accomplish, i. e. the Intention, as well as of what has been accomplished thus far; and Conscientiousness co-ordinates the two, connecting the latest datum with the preceding data, and comparing the synthesis with the original Intention. The traditional conception of 'Consciousness' as an incorporeal information-processor, leaves little room for entailing a function in Action, and, hence, for one of a constraint on the latter.

Saturday, September 12, 2009

Determinism, Free Will, and Exposition

One of the enduring problems of modern Philosophy is often known as the 'Determinism vs. Free Will' debate, also occasionally referred to as 'Necessity vs. Freedom', and similar other titles. A movement is 'Determined'= it is the effect of a prior cause that is itself the effect of a prior cause, while a movement is the effect of 'Free Will'= it is the effect of a cause that is not itself the effect of a prior cause. One extreme view in the debate e. g. Spinoza's, is that all movements are Determined, the other, e. g. early Sartre's, is that all are the product of Free Will, with a variety of intermediate positions, e. g. Kant's that the two are different perspectives on the same event, also prominently appearing. Briefly, the Determinist argues that Free Will is an illusion, and that we are always subject to larger forces, while the opposition maintains that Free Will is a familiar, self-evident phenomenon the denial of which is an evasion of responsibility. Interestingly, and perhaps, tellingly, the closest that Aristotle comes to tackling this question is when he discusses Voluntary action, as part of his trying to establish criteria for culpability. This relatively modest treatment of the issue tends to support the hypothesis that the entire debate is framed by a specific Theological concern, namely, the question that given that God is bothomnipotent and Good, how is the existence of Evil possible? The answer provided by the predominant Western Theological tradition is that only humans can be the origin of Evil, in which case they must possess Free Will. But if this concern is the genesis of the entire debate, than it is hardly an eternal question. In contrast, the Formaterial System entails that only the Past is set in stone, but that the degree of 'Freedom', e. g. of Exposition, possible at any moment, is a function of who the Individual happens to be then, and what the circumstances are. Such a position might be too unwieldy for some of the traditional views, on any side of the question, but it seems in complete accordance with everyday experience.

Friday, September 11, 2009

Conduct and Evolvement

'Behavior' and 'conduct' are, in themselves, approximately synonymous. But, the former, primarily via its appropriation by 'Behaviorism', has taken on the connotation of 'conditioned response', whereas the latter, reinforced by the meaning of the verb 'to conduct', tends to connotate voluntary movements. So, I will be using 'Conduct' to mean 'Individual Behavior'. Conduct is Intentional motion, where an 'Intention' is an imagistic variation on a what one has previously been doing, that precedes and guides further motions that one is to attempt. For example, my Intention to go for a walk is an imagined variation on my previous activity of reading, that will guide how I proceed. An 'Action' is an Intentional movement. In other words, Action is Individual Evolvement. Now, insofar as there are varying degrees of Individual Becoming-Diverse, there are varying degrees of Individual Evolvement. Repetition is minimal Diversification, so Intentional continuing what one has been doing, or Intentional sticking to a routine, are processes of minimal Evolvement. Greater Evolvement can be variation on a routine, multiplying one's tasks, seeking new adventure, etc. Perhaps an extreme example of putting oneself outside oneself is Acting for the sake of another, so Action for someone else's benefit is generally a type of greatly Evolved Conduct.

Thursday, September 10, 2009

Personal Growth

A more common expression for 'Individual Evolvement' is 'personal growth'. That Growth is a recognized physiological principle, and that people can continue to grow in a variety of respects even after physical growth has reached a limit, are familiar to most. Nevertheless, that 'Personal Growth' might be a fundamental human Principle has hitherto eluded most theorists, for which there seem to be three main reasons. First, is the predominance of 'Self-Preservation' theories of human nature, with respect to which Growth is a merely extrinsic phenomenon. Second, is the predominance of Teleological theories of human nature, entailing some concept of unsurpassable perfection, e. g. Rational being, the Soul, the actualizable Self, etc., with respect to which Growth can be no more than a means. Third is the lack of any constructive Principle of Diversification, without which description of Growth is impossible. The Material Principle, Becoming-Diverse, in general, fills that lack, so its manifestation in the Individual, Exposition, facilitates the presentation of a theory of human nature that can more easily accommodate some familiar phenomena than the predominant traditional theories have been able to.

Wednesday, September 9, 2009

Individual Evolvement

The Formaterial concept of the Individual thus entails a concept of Individual Evolvement--any increase in Exposition without loss of Propriation--thereby addressing one of the chronic shortcomings in orthodox Evolutionary Theory. Hitherto, the role in Evolution of a particular member of a species has been defined in terms of 'survival of the fittest', in which 'survival' means the continued existence of the species, and 'fitness' refers to the most successful adaptability to an environment by some member. That the Evolutionary principle and the Survival principle were conceived as heteronomous, with priority accorded to the latter, by theorizers such as Spencer, is perhaps best expressed by the point that in their theories, given the survival of a species, evolution is no longer necessary. But, the relation between Survival and Evolution, i. e. continuing to live vs. growing, is analogous to that between Motion and Acceleration--the former is a special case of the latter. And, that any Evolutionary principle would aim for a mere minimum of Evolution is, at best, a questionable hypothesis. Furthermore, the notion that the behavior of particular members is guided by the principle of 'Adaptation to the Environment', is a relic of theories that construe behavior as a response to some environmental destabilization. But, such construals cannot accommodate the notion of self-destabilization, e. g. self-variation, expecially one that is a fundamental ingredient in self-growth. If they could, a species member could be conceived of as more than a means to survival, via the achievement of physical or economic strength, of the species, which is what the most prominent orthodox theories take the Evolutionary role of a particular member to be. Rather, it could be conceived of as entailing an Individual principle of Evolving, which, as will be discussed shortly in more detail, is, at the same time, an ingredient in the Evolvement, i. e. in the increase in Complexity, of its species.

Tuesday, September 8, 2009

Spatio-Temporality and Evolvement

Diversification is indefinite and infinite. For example, simple numerical diversification can be doubling, or tripling, or quadrupling, etc. Individual Becoming-Diverse is likewise indefinite, with infinite possibilities. The specifically Individual type of Becoming-Diverse is in terms of Externalization, so those possibilities can be expressed in terms of degrees of Spatialization, of which there are infinite possibilities, to an indefinite extent. The range of Spatialization begins, for example, with seclusion, and extends to 'casting one's fate to the wind', e. g. exposure to the elements, dissolution in intoxication, getting lost in a mob, etc. On the other hand, Individual Becoming-the-Same is Internalization, and such Making-One's-Own can be expressed as Temporization, i. e. Making-Part-of-One's-Past. Now the relation in any System of Becoming-Diverse to Becoming-the-Same is Complexity. And, any increase in Complexity is Evolvement. In other words, Individual Evolvement can be expressed in Spatio-Temporal terms.

Monday, September 7, 2009

The Present

The 'Present' seems to unify Space and Time, insofar as it commonly means both 'Here' and 'Now'. However, these meanings ignore the links to 'There' and 'Then'. Likewise, the principle 'Live in the Present!' can degenerate from 'Pay attention!' to a formula for superficiality, if the Now is severed from the Then that leads into it, or the Here is isolated from a subsequential There. Even granted such wider scope, these are still static notions that are ultimately indistinguishable from one another. In contrast, to Exposit means 'to Present', and to Propriate means 'to represent the pre-sent'. So, the Present is, more accurately, non-coincidingly Janus-faced.

Sunday, September 6, 2009

Post-Kantian Spatio-Temporality

The Formaterial theory of Space and Time insists upon their equipollence and heterogeneity with respect to one another. Now, when he subjects 'Outer Experience' to a species of 'Inner', Kant is according priority to Temporality. However, he eventually corrects this imbalance, when he argues that Self-Knowledge is impossible without Space. In contrast, some prominent post-Kantian systems unequivocally privilege Temporality, For Bergson, the essence of Temporality is the pure flux of 'Duration', of which his 'Space' is a de-vitalized residue. But, the unaddressed problem for Bergson is how the purely Temporal Duration can both be cumulative, and extend beyond what has accumulated, which are two heterogeneous processes, one of which, as has been shown here, is Spatial. On the one hand, Nietzsche's Zarathustra can see only Time leading out from the 'Moment, on the other, his Will to Power is an Externalization of Force. While Samuel Alexander accords equal status to Space and Time, he offers no grounds for distinguishing them from one another. For Whitehead, his Temporal 'Process' is dynamic, but given that his system offers no accommodation of Locomotility, that his version of Space, 'the Extensive Contiuum', is no more than an acausal epiphenomenon, is not surprising. Heidegger, followed in this respect by another Phenomenologist, Sartre, reduces Space to a mode of Time. In his system, what surrounds one is the 'ready-to-hand' potential 'Future'. In his terminology, the critique of 'Future' previously presented here, is that 'readiness' is not given, but has to be created, e. g. a chair has to first be placed in Spatial proximity to me before it can serve me as 'equipment' for a possible 'Future' action. Given the Ontological significance of Temporality expressed in the title, 'Being and Time', this critique of 'Future' undermines Heidegger's entire system. Finally, any extension of the 'Space-Time' homogenization of contemporary Physics from quantified to experiential Space and Time remains unjustified.

Saturday, September 5, 2009

Common Notions of Time and Space

With Time and Space both dynamic processes, one traditional common notion of 'Time', as 'passage', fails to distinguish Time from Space. Probably the other most common meaning of 'Time' is the Aristotelian one, 'the measure of Motion', namely what clocks and calendars provide. Now, while these are often casually thought to present a succession of milestones, such milestones are actually privileged punctuations of cyclical movements, e. g. the rotation of clock hands, that are cumulative as well, e. g. as the second hand returns to 12, the minute hand moves forward. This pattern of accumulating return is analogous to the Formaterial Temporal pattern of the terminating and retention of motions in the moment of Reflection. On the other hand, two common usages of 'Space' together almost precisely express its essence. 'Outer Space', referring to what is beyond the Earth, and 'Give me my space', a request for room to move, together capture the notion of an Outsideness that is rooted in Locomotility. The easy hypostasization of these, i. e. Space as circumambience, only emphasizes how derivative the further constructions of Geometrical Space are. The three common 'dimensions' of 'Space', width, height, and depth, are products of a useful but ultimately arbitrary subdivision of already hypostasized 'Space', based on a rectangularization that seems to abstract from the side-to-side, foot-to-head, and front-to-back characteristics of the hypostasized human 'Body'. Directionality is the product of further subdivision. Now, hypostasization, in general, entails the bringing to a close of a motion, which is what occurs in Temporisation. In other words, Geometrical 'Space' is a Spatio-Temporal hybrid.

Friday, September 4, 2009

Innerness and Time

Despite being sometimes called 'peripatetic', Aristotle's characterization of his God as 'unmoved' places him squarely in the Pythagorean-Parmenidean-Platonist tradition of privileging Rest over Motion. In contrast, one of the significant innovations of Newtonian Physics is the centrality of Force and Acceleration to the System. Constant Motion and even Inertia are defined in those terms. But Philosophy has been slow to catch a hint, continuing to treat Corporeality in static terms. With the Kantian revolution, there is the beginning of dynamic treatment of Corporeality, one which two hundred years later continues its slow development. The 'Body' is still frequently promoted as the essence of individual corporeality, whereas from a dynamic perspective, it is an hypostasization, derived from a homeostatic representation used to guide movement. 'Inside the body' is thus, likewise, a derivative representation. Given a static notion of the Body, the 'inside' is what is contained by the periphery, i. e. the epidermis, and 'internalization' is simply a relocation of something from beyond that periphery to within it. But in the dynamic concept, it is not merely that the bodily image is constantly getting reconstructed, but that such reconstruction is one of the phases of Internalization. To put it more generally, in the dynamic concept of the Individual, Inner Sense is a feeling of a part by a whole that is itself a product of that feeling, the static image of which only being subequently generated. The Kantian, and Formaterial, association of Innerness with Time primarily, not Space, is one expression of a commitment to a theory of the Individual as dynamic.

Thursday, September 3, 2009

Some Spatio-Temporal Confusions

One of the main purposes of the foregoing analyses of Space and Time is to expose some confusions that have prevailed in some prominent traditional theories, and that are at the root of some common attitudes. The theory of Time presented here challenges the thesis that the Past does not exist. The latter is typically based on a conception of Time as a succession of instants, in which, once surpassed, an instant ceases to exist. One practical expression of such a theory is Irresponsibility, i. e. that one's actions are of no consequence to one beyond their occurrence. In contrast, if, as presented here, the Past is part of the Present, then all one's previous actions are always part of one. Furthermore, if Time exists, and, as tradition has it, the Future is part of Time, then the Future exists. Thinking along such lines is at the root of some of the most common of fatalistic attitudes, e. g. the resignation that the Future is already written, and is only waiting to befall one. In contrast, here the 'Future' is actually a Future Present, and a Present is only first produced by a Propriation-Propriated relation. But in that relation, the Propriated is an Exposition, e. g. is some locomotility that will have preceded the reflection upon it. In other words, the 'Future' must await the performance of some action, meaning that it cannot be 'already written'. So, just as the Formaterial theory of the Past demonstrates that Individuality entails Responsibility for one's actions, its theory of the Future demonstrates how Individuality entails a certain Freedom of action.

Wednesday, September 2, 2009

Temporization and Time

Just as 'Space' for Kant is 'the Form of Outer Sense', for him 'Time' is 'the Form of Inner Sense'. The following example illustrates what for him is 'Inner Sense'. One perceives the front of a house, and then one perceives the side of the house. Now, if the house is rotating, the connection between the two perceptions is first and foremost 'outer'. But, it is also 'inner', which can be more easily discerned if the house is not moving at all, but one has walked around to the side of the house. In the latter case, the connection is privately experienced as a succession of perceptions, and it is the privacy that constitutes for Kant 'innerness', while 'Time' is that successiveness. But, in order for a series of perceptions to be in 'Inner Sense', it plainly needs to first be referred to it, as opposed to some outer object, e. g. the house. In other words, it must be preceded by a process of Internalization. What, in Kant's analysis, precedes the arrival in Inner Sense is a representing of the original perception, so the original perception needs to have already occurred in order for it to be represented. So, the very process of representation itself entails successiveness--first the original perception, and then the representation of the latter. Furthermore, just as a photo includes its object, representation internalizes what it represents. Thus, 'Inner Sense' is the product of Internalization, and, similarly, Time is the product of a process of Temporization. In the Formaterial System, Propriation is that process of Internalization, so Temporization can be defined as the 'structure of Propriation'. So, Kant's definition of Time is not inaccurate, but insufficient. Now, the foregoing demonstrates that the single fundamental 'dimension' of Time is 'inside of'. That is, the immediate object of any representation is always an action articulated in the present perfect progressive tense, e. g. I am aware that I have been looking at a house--even if one continues to look at the house as one makes the articulation, the articulation can represent only what has already actually occurred. The representation treats the represented as terminated, more precisely, as having led up to the terminating representation. So, in more tradional temporal terminology, 'inside of' is a relation between past and present. In other words, 'future' is not a fundamental Temporal dimension, to be discussed subsequently in more detail.

Tuesday, September 1, 2009

Spatialization and Space

While it represents an advance over its predecessors, Kant's definition of Space, 'the Form of Outer Sense', still obscures its essence in two respects. First, as has been discussed, it lacks an explanation of Outerness. Neither Stoic detachment nor Sartreian 'flight', while separating one from one's environment, fail to characterize the latter as 'outside' the Subject. Schelling more promisingly describes 'Space' as being created by the I pushing its environment away from it, but, again, this 'Space', as is, divides only two side-by-side realms. Instead, 'Outer' is meaningful only with respect to 'Inner', namely, as generated by a process of Externalization, which must arise from within. In one's experience, only 'locomotility', namely an internally generated change of position, seems to qualify as such. A more familiar example of locomotility is intentional action, namely the generation of motion by a thought, for which the general term here is Exposition. In other words, the objects of 'Outer' sense are all, first and foremost, objects that one might encounter in motion, which corresponds to the role that the senses play in everyday activities. So, Kant's first shortcoming is to associate Outerness with the cognitive, not the behavioral sphere. Second, as e. g. Schelling underscores, Space entails separation, but 'Form' entails linkage. In other words, Form is antithetical to the essence of Space, which Kant seems to overlook in his eagerness to present Geometry, and its closed figures, as the Science of 'Space'. Thus, instead, in the Formaterial System, 'Space' is the product of 'Spatialization', which is the general structure of Exposition, and the fundamental 'dimension' of Space is 'outside of'. The traditional 'dimensions' of traditional 'Space', not to mention further additions proposed by contemporary Physics, are all the products of projections of the one dimension, in combination with constructions that can only come from other resources, to be discussed soon. Finally, insofar as an 'Object' is anything outside the Subject, Spatialization is also Objectivization.